The Intersection Between Kantian Human Dignity and Ubuntu/Hunhu: A Critical Engagement with Oliver Sensen’s Perspective

Abstract

Human dignity is a central concept in moral, legal, and political discourse, often invoked as the foundation of rights and ethical treatment. Traditional interpretations of Kantian dignity emphasise its intrinsic worth, tied to rational autonomy. However, Oliver Sensen offers a nuanced view, contending that, for Kant, dignity should be understood as a relational property, arising from our moral relations rather than from internal capacities. Sensen argues that human dignity, in the Kantian sense, is not a quality possessed in degrees or based on individual traits, but is rooted in the moral status rational beings hold by virtue of their autonomy. Particularly, Sensen’s conception of human dignity resonates with the classical understanding of Hunhu/ Ubuntu in an African Ethical context. Ubuntu, a Southern African philosophical tradition, centres on the idea of personhood as inherently relational. It upholds values of mutual respect, shared responsibility, and ethical living within the community. In this worldview, human dignity is not a solitary possession but a quality nurtured through meaningful relationships, moral behaviour, and the recognition of each person’s humanity. The guiding principle, ‘I am because we are’, captures this ethic, affirming that dignity flourishes through collective care and moral solidarity. It is therefore the aim of this paper to examine the relationship between Sensen’s relational reading and Ubuntu in the African context. The paper will also consider the relevance of Sensen’s understanding to contemporary African societies while looking at the significance of human dignity in contemporary moral thought.