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The distinguishing mark of this journal is its interest in the formulation and presentation of African philosophy in a contemporary form that directs the field into the future. The journal is interested in contributions that specifically link philosophy to the contemporary needs of Africa (from philosophy) as well as contributions that are imaginative in their attempt at shaping African philosophical discourse beyond affirmations of its existence. The journal is published three times a year and is a peer-to-peer review.

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Resistance to an Unjust Government: A Case Study of Apartheid in South Africa

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Abstract

This discourse examines the dynamics of ethical dimensions pertaining to unjust governments, using apartheid South Africa as a case study. Qualitative methodology was used to analyze morality of violence, using autonomy and civil disobedience as footstools. This piece will expose its readers to philosophical concepts such as norms, ethics, foundational beliefs, epistemology etc. It is the aim of this piece to dissect the perception of totality and reality in the formation of social processes.

Keywords: apartheid government, ethics, norms, autonomy, violence, civil disobedience, foundational beliefs.

Introduction

The South African apartheid was a system of government set in place to protect the supremacy of a minority group (Whites) and to repress a majority group (Blacks) through a policy of almost complete separation[1]. The European colonization of South Africa by the Germans and English settlers began in the 17th century[2]. Apartheid was instituted as a policy in order to further the continuation of domination and supremacy of whites over the country and its resources[3]. Through this, the black South Africans were systematically marginalized, "The rights of black South Africans were systematically stripped away, they were denied citizenship and forced to live in either isolated, impoverished, rural communities or shanty towns surrounding major cities" (April and Marchese 2014, p3). Apartheid, as a form of government, began after the elections of 1948 when the Afrikaner Nationalist Party became the majority party, and this system lasted until 1994[4].

The prime political organization in the grapple to vanquish the apartheid government and win majority rule for black South Africans was the African National Congress (ANC), founded in

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[1] Jemison, E.L. (2014). The Nazi Influence in the formation of apartheid in South Africa.

[2] April, F and Marchese, V. (2014). Apartheid South Africa and the Soweto Rebellion.

[3] April, F and Marchese, V. (2014). Apartheid South Africa and the Soweto Rebellion.

[4] Jemison, E.L. (2014). The Nazi Influence in the formation of apartheid in South Africa.

1912[5]. There were other political organizations in the fight against apartheid, a notable one being the Pan Africanist Congress, which led demonstrations in Sharpeville against the passbook system in 1960 (white policemen killed 67 Blacks that day)[6].

In the early days of the ANC, legal tactics of peaceful protests and occasional strikes were deployed to fight apartheid[7], these tactics were non-violent. However, due to bourgeois and unlimited marginalization, social injustice, exclusion of the black minority group which started in the late 1940s, ANC resorted to violence. Nelson Mandela, who was the leader of ANC at that time, and others, lead an armed uprising against the apartheid government[8]. The armed resistance was limited to occasional bombings of government facilities, burning of police cars, looting white owned businesses etc.[9]

Moral question and philosophy of norms

These actions carried out by the ANC and the repressed black South Africans led to the moral/ethical question; can the causality of violence (in the case of apartheid South Africa) be morally justified? To simplify it, is it morally right for individuals to revolt (using violence) against a government that oppresses them?

In conflict situations, actions and decisions are subjected to moral and ethical evaluation. There is always an ethical aspect to a given decision, which gives us grounds to evaluate the ANC's decision morally and ethically on using violence to make their voice heard.

Ethics can be divided into two groups; anterior ethics and posterior (applied) ethics[10].[11] Posterior ethics deal with legal norms (consent) and they come from general rules. Where does the content/normativeness of a legal norm come from? Kelsen (1934) answers this by saying an act or an event gains its legal-normative meaning by another legal higher norm that confers this normative meaning to it. This higher norm is called the ground norm[12]. From where does this ground norm originate or get its normativeness and validity from?

Kelsen (1934) further explained that at some stage in every legal system, we get to an authorizing norm that has not been authorized by any other legal norm, at this stage this norm has to be presupposed to be legally valid. The normative content of this presupposition is what Kelsen (1934) called the basic norm. These legal norms can be influenced by political structures; for example, it was a legal norm, which was politically constructed, for Blacks not

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[5] Jemison, E.L. (2014). The Nazi Influence in the formation of apartheid in South Africa.

[6] Jemison, E.L. (2014). The Nazi Influence in the formation of apartheid in South Africa.

[7] Lester, R. Kurtz, L. R. (June 2010). The Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa (1912–1992).

[8] Jemison, E.L. (2014). The Nazi Influence in the formation of apartheid in South Africa.

[9] Jemison, E.L. (2014). The Nazi Influence in the formation of apartheid in South Africa.

[10] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

[11] For the purpose of this paper, I will dwell more on posterior ethics.

[12] Kelsen, H. (1934). Pure theory of Law. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.

to go to some white residential areas in South Africa unless they (Blacks) had a passbook. This shows political structures can influence change in social regulations.

On the other hand, moral as the core of ethics has two sides which are the objective and the subjective[13]. The objective as a norm (command) is binding, while action on the subjective is through practical reasoning and tribunal of reasoning, which is the centre of truth. A norm does not exist without certain characteristics which are its binding characters. It is these to which it can be generalized, the binding aspect leads to the subjective, and the moral subject is defined by the objective aspect of the norm.

Moral norms are clues on how humans ought to exercise their freedom. (I.e., the accepted or typical behaviour in a group). A moral norm can be expressed as rules, principles, dispositions, characters or traits in a given society. Moral norms are the criteria of judgment about the sorts of persons that we ought to be and the sorts of actions that we ought to perform. "Moral norms provide us with some consistency and stability in the moral life by bringing about some depth and breadth to our moral judgment" (Helene 2014, p 24). Moral norms provide us with patterns for human conduct which allow us to adequately evaluate the moral dilemmas and conflict situations that we face daily, pertaining to what is the right or wrong thing to do. This paper argue that moral norms help us determine what is right and good within a given situation especially in conflicting situations like apartheid South Africa.

The objective evaluation of an action involves moral decision making[14]. Action is the primary and most proximate thing while evaluating conflict situations. The objective is distinct from the action, in this way; one chooses to do something for the sake of some end; the sake which one chooses is the objective in moral evaluation. For example, black South Africans employed violence (bombing of official government buildings and burning of police cars etc...) to eradicate the apartheid government. The foundational belief that apartheid is wrong (social norm) is the guiding principle that justifies or rationalizes the use of violence, this is the objective in moral evaluation. While the black South Africans are the subjective and the violence carried out is the action through practical reasoning. We can question certain norms or principles which can be accredited to human behaviours (actions). This accreditation is autonomy, and the subject has the autonomy to challenge its foundation[15].

Proponents of teleological ethics or proportionalism argue that one may choose to destroy, damage, or impede a basic human good, such as life for the sake of bringing about a proportionate end (justice)[16]. According to this, one cannot say any specific type of action in achieving an end, be it violence or otherwise will always be morally appealing. It is always possible that some circumstances might arise in which such a choice would be justified for the sake of reaching an objective goal. From these justifications, we cannot exclude civil disobedience/resistance to an unjust government.

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[13] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

[14] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

[15] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

[16] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

We identify and evaluate the moral dimension of conflict by raising moral and ethical questions, identifying mechanism and criteria for justifying our decisions. We define moral dimension as a situation where a decision is to be made regarding an action where the question that arises is about what is good or bad and whether it is better to carry out one action or another. Where does a norm come from? If the content of norms comes from the society, are they, morally right? The legal system says the content of a norm comes from ethics[17]. As for the legal dimension, it is just not about good or bad; if you are acting within the law, you are acting morally.

Criteria that can be relied on to justify or evaluate the moral and ethical value of a decision are norms. The content of the norms stem from three sources[18]. Pre-modern norms which are based on religion, traditions, culture and are believed to originate through revelations (God and the king). Secondly, modern norms which are based on science, reason and logic which give rise to legal (law) and political institutions (Government). Lastly, post-modern norms which are decisional/operational modes of social regulation. Post-modern norms are diverse, and can stem from different sources (individual beliefs, religion, culture, political institutions) depending on the circumstance on hand and are determined by case basis. In recent times, post-modern norms have proven to be more ethical than moral.

Is it necessary to consider the violent actions of the ANC from a moral point of view? Different schools of thought have different answers to that. For the universalists, they would say that there are fundamental truths and foundational beliefs that are universal regarding what is moral and what isn't. Violence and armed resistance to a government will be seen as immoral. However, relativists would say violence has its dynamics and there is no fundamental truth governing it, if it needs to be applied to a particular situation, then it should be applied.

Autonomy

People possess autonomy because they are accountable for their actions. We are not free and capable human beings unless we take full responsibility for the decisions that affect our lives[19]. The subject has the autonomy to challenge its foundation[20], to be free humans; we must not be enslaved by the system. Autonomy is a condition of freedom, the more you convince yourself that you do not have autonomy, the less free you become. Based on this, South Africans are deemed fit to challenge the legitimacy of the Apartheid government. The minorities (Whites) in South Africa played mind games with the majorities (Blacks), for instance, the Blacks were restricted from taking passport photographs from the same studio as the Whites based on the norm of the apartheid government of segregation[21]. Was it the duty of the minority group to

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[17] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

[18] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

[19] Toscano, R. (2005). *Commemoration of Paul Ricoeur*

[20] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

[21] Jemison, E.L. (2014). The Nazi Influence in the formation of apartheid in South Africa.

challenge this norm? We must question the criteria that give validity to a norm (Autonomy is the relation of a subject to question the content of a norm).

Accountability is important when it comes to autonomy. Nelson Mandela went to jail for 27 years because he was autonomous, freedom is a consequence of autonomy it is not a condition. Toscano (2005) explained that it is not that we attribute man's(persons) action to him because he is free, but man is free because we ascribe his action to him (i.e., people possess autonomy because they are accountable for their actions). Hence autonomy is not freedom; we can differentiate autonomy from freedom in that, autonomy concerns itself with the ability to act, without external or internal constraints. While freedom is our ability to use reason to choose our own actions. Freedom requires that we utilize a law to guide our decisions, a law that can come to us only by an act of our own will.

Civil Disobedience

Through disobedience, we are able to take a stand on what we believe is moral or ethical[22]. According to Thoreau (1849), the government can be challenged if its laws or practices are seen as immoral. Through disobedience and resistance, we can question the legitimacy of an unjust government. We can refuse to pay taxes as a form of protest, this is a way of demonstrating our autonomy. As citizens we have the obligation to disobey and to resist unjust authorities and laws. If the government fails to protect basic human rights it should be resisted and challenged. Thoreau (1849) explained that we should willingly submit to punishment (he slept in a prison cell for a night). He views that under a government which imprisons persons unjustly, the true place for a just man is in a prison, if imprisonments will guarantee your autonomy then you should be imprisoned as Nelson Mandela was.

La Boétie (1548) stated that freedom from servitude comes not from violent actions, but from the refusal to serve, this makes tyrants fall. He stated that when individuals withdraw their support from the system, tyrants fall. He suggested that a government does not have to be popularly elected (like apartheid government) to enjoy general public support; for general public support is in the very nature of all governments that endure, including the most oppressive of tyrannies[23]. However, if the citizens refuse to pay their taxes, as Thoreau (1548) explained, then there tends to be a fall of the tyrannical government. La Boétie (1548) said there is no need to fight a tyrant, if the country refuses consent to its own enslavement then the tyrant is automatically defeated. La Boétie (1548) pointed out that the more one yields to tyrants the stronger and mightier they become. The best way to oust them is by not obeying them.

In carrying out civil disobedience there is always a form of higher law or power, it can be divine law of god or some form of moral reasoning[24], from which it takes its legitimacy, that was why

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[22] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

[23] Etienne de la Boétie. *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude.* (1548).

[24] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

Thoreau (1849) said our conscience is paramount and is more important than governmental laws (conscience above the law). A government that has failed to fulfil its duties has lost its legitimacy and this gives the citizens the moral right to disobey/resist. Hence, Thoreau (1849) said a person must "wash his hands"[25] of injustice and not be associated with something that is wrong. Thoreau (1849) explained the hypocrisy of a person who commanded a soldier for refusing to fight in an unjust war while continuing to sustain the unjust government (paying taxes). An example he gave is the abolitionists who he suggested should immediately stop lending either their persons or their property to support the government of Massachusetts, he advocated the non-payment of taxes or fulfilling social responsibilities to an unjust government, La Boétie (1548) agreed with this.

Conclusion

Thematic question; can experience be a foundational belief for truth-hood or false-hood of a thought (freedom)?

Dialectic definition of truth and theory is thought[26], practice and personal truths that can be reality. Totality is having a representation of reality. Feelings and thoughts can be manipulated, hence, creating a pseudo-reality. Totality comes from rationalism[27], rationalism comes from the category of error, error-before truth category. Concrete totality is the category that governs reality "The rightness of this view only emerges with complete clarity when we direct our attention to the real, material substratum of our method" (Lukacs 1923, p3)[28]. So, the conception of justice is not real, until it has been brought to life (reality) through demonstrations, peaceful protests, and sometimes violence (in the case of apartheid South Africa). Justice and liberation are only a thought which is not real until it has been brought to life, though when we live through circumstances this is not the same as reality; your experience of reality is sharpened by your thought. "The intelligibility of objects develops in proportion as we grasp their function in the totality to which they belong" (Lukacs 1923, p 13)[29]. Therefore, only the "dialectical" conception of totality and liberty can enable us to understand reality as a social process[30] this can be done without invoking violence to resist an unjust government.

In evaluating the morality of violence and resistance against an unjust government, this paper concludes that violent conduct (which includes the destruction of lives and properties) is never the answer to an unjust government. However, it is fair for individuals to non-violently protest an oppressive government as argued by Nelson Mandela (post incarceration) and Henry Thoreau.

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[25] Thoreau, D.H. (1849). *Civil Disobedience*.

[26] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

[27] Helene Tessier. (2014). Ethical Dimensions of Conflict. Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada.

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[29] Lukacs, G. (1923). *History and Class Consciousness.* What is Orthodox Marxism?

[30] Lukacs, G. (1923). *History and Class Consciousness.* What is Orthodox Marxism?

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The Nature of Relations Between Religion and State: The Case of South Africa

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Abstract

Historically, there have been various forms of religion-state relations in the world, most of which have evolved. The major models that characterise the relations between religion and state are the secular atheism model, theocratic model, strict separation model and the co-operationist model. These models can be generally considered as Weberian ideal types; that is, analytical representations of existing state practices vis-à-vis religion that abstracts from empirical realities. This article analyses the nature of relations between religion and state and the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom in South Africa. Having briefly discussed the four general structures of state-religion relations, the article argues that the South African model is characterised as 'separation with interaction'. The article also argues such a model is rooted in the South African Constitution which highlights the centrality of religious freedom. The openness of the Constitution and flexible nature of relations between the South African state and religion provides a basis for the involvement of religious organisations in the public sphere has been the case with the National Interfaith Council of South Africa (NICSA).

Keywords: Politics, Religion, Constitution, Freedom, Rights, Cooperationist, Democratic, South Africa

Introduction

Some modern democracies are built on the centuries-old mutual relationship between religious institutions and political forces. The first section of this article discusses the general forms of religion-state structures; namely, secular atheism model, theocratic model, strict separation model and the co-operationist model. Democratic contexts portray religion as an effective political instrument to the extent that religious institutions collaborate with the state to implement certain policies. In Africa, religion continues to be a powerful source of positive change for facilitating democracy, addressing human rights, forming multi-religious education and contributing to the transformation of society.[31] In some contexts, the centrality of religion

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[31] Historically, some religions have stirred conflict, discrimination and prejudice thereby promoting political instability and the undemocratization of society. For example, Muslim militant groups such as Boko Haram and Al Qaeda have often engaged in various intolerable and violent acts such as the killing of innocent people perceived

has given it the political power to continue influencing several governmental decisions based on the nature of relations between the state and religion. Having discussed the nature of relations between religion and state in South Africa, the article shows that based on South Africa's current nature and historical relationship between religion and state, religion cannot be disqualified from public involvement. The final section indicates that the Constitution creates a fundamental basis for the flexible relations between the state and different religions in South Africa.

General Forms of Religion-State Structures

When analysing the nature of relations between religion and state from both historical and contemporary perspectives, four major models can be considered: namely, secular atheism model, theocratic model, strict separation model and the co-operationist model. The major models that characterise the relations between religion and state are the secular atheism model, theocratic model, strict separation model and the co-operationist model. An atheist state suppresses religion due to its hostility towards religious groups and the general integration of explicit anti-religious sentiments into the political system. In an atheist state, atheism is considered as the official doctrine or policy of the state to the extent that religious values and beliefs are not recognised. For example, the need to uphold religious and moral principles by religious groups in the public sphere is suppressed.

A distinction can be created between the moderate and extreme or militant versions of political atheism states. Extreme or militant atheism is what Paul Cliteur (2011:152) dubs "totalitarian atheism". This form of political atheism is based on the absolute atheist-centred system of government which neither associates itself with religion nor encourages religious operations, practices or activities. The state assumes totalitarian power to impart atheist ideas and delimit the religious convictions of citizens through suppression. This means that religious values would be considered as strictly private, with no role in society; that is, religious institutions have no influence and power on any aspects of society.

By contrast, the moderate form of political atheism might tolerate the existence of religion but grant it a peripheral existence. While religious political influence in society is significantly limited, non-religious views and approaches are often encouraged. Religious activities would be tolerated under rigorous regulation and without free expression in public forums. Kurt Lash (2013:305) expresses this as follows:

> *Under this model, religion is treated as a problem which requires affirmative government regulation. Law under this model tends to minimize, supress or otherwise influence citizens away from religious belief and conduct ... government has power to regulate religious expression and conduct on the basis of the idea or*

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as infidels or unbelievers. Moreover, the kidnapping and raping of innocent young girls and the many suicide bombers who kill people in the name of religion sometimes with selfish motives cannot be ignored. Although one might argue that such terrorist groups are not Muslim, the fact remains that they do what they do in the name of religion, often categorically following religious texts attributed to a god. This can be attached to the idea that religious claims are sometimes perceived as obligatory and are stipulated clearly without compromise.

belief expressed. All religions may be regulated or only those religions that are considered to be especially dangerous to secular political ideas.

The theocratic model is opposite to extreme secular atheism. Extreme theocracies create a very strong bond between religious rule and the state. Such states are intolerant of other world views contrary to the dominant religious framework. Sometimes, theocratic states are deemed "religious states" due to the presence of an established or official state religion.[32] Thus, theocracies often operate under established official religions which provide legitimacy to the state and the political system. In theocracies, the religious bond and principle "form the legitimacy of a theocratic state ruled by a political class of a dominant creed used for consolidation and exercise of power" (Gross 1998:26). Since religious doctrine is incorporated into the political system, religious dictates are employed for the expression of the law. The favoured religious perspective is perceived as absolute to the exclusion of other religions and world views through force and law.

The idea that one religion should be given priority over others is often justified based on the historical significance, or statistical dominance of a favoured religious group. Moreover, the state is perceived as a religious structure and the rulers are primarily religious leaders, or at least those that ascribe to the doctrine of the state religion. For example, prior to the Weimar Constitution of 1919,[33] Germany had state churches. Theocracies require that religion grants legitimacy to the acceptance of political power, government and its officials, because religious principles and doctrine shape the values and attitudes of the people. Where there is an official religion of the state, the rule of law might reflect religious dictates in its legal system. Since public activities and moral behaviour are interpreted based on religious doctrine, theocracies are non-accommodative of other world views that are contrary to the accepted norms of the established religion or religious group. Saudi Arabia stands as a representative of a theocratic state in the contemporary world.

By contrast, a separationist state advocates an absolute separation between state and religion; it maintains a middle way position between secular atheism and theocracies. A separationist state neither favours the presence of an established religion with substantial influence on the state, nor a completely atheist state, which is aggressive towards religion. While the state has the secular function, religious bodies focus on the sacred. The model of strict separation prevents the state and society from being influenced by religion, which can occur when religious institutions are given excessive power in a theocratic state. Similarly, the state would betray the separationist principles if it grants support to religion through aid in a way that shows endorsement of any religious organisation or institution.

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[32] Most Islamic states are religious states since Islam as a religion does not make a distinction between religious and political affairs. Islam is one system which includes all aspects of life and society. By contrast, Christianity creates a separation between religion and politics. In this case, one cannot talk of a religious state but state religion whereby a political system which is dominantly Christian employs Christian values extensively to the detriment of other religions and worldviews.

[33] Article 37 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919 declared that "there is no established state church in Germany". This came after the founding of democracy when the throne of the Germany emperor was abolished.

France is an example of a separationist state whose model of separation is based on the concept of *laïcité* which literally means 'secularity.' This system encourages neither the participation of religion in the public sphere and government matters nor the state's involvement in religious affairs. The French political secularism applies the principle of *laïcité* through several policies and legislations such as by legally prohibiting the state from recognising any religion. Nevertheless, France acknowledges religious organisations based on the legal framework without addressing religious doctrine or interfering with religious determinism in the private sphere. The state does not uphold or recognise religion although it remains neutral and accommodative towards the existence of different religions. Regarding the *laïcité* form of the separationist model such as that of France, Paul Cliteur (2011:15) affirms:

> *It is more often characterised as secularism tout court. It is the explicit aim of political secularism not to choose for or against religion. The state will remain "neutral". All religions (as far as they do not advocate violence) may be represented in society, but none of them has a privileged position…In a system that operates under the banner of laïcité, the state is not allowed to make favourable propaganda for religion, but also upholds a ban on financing churches or other religious institutions. The pretence of political secularism is that within this approach, the state does not manifest an anti-religious outlook, as its critics want us to believe, but a non-religious stance.*

Contrary to the separationist states, cooperationist regimes establish neither an official religion nor act in a way that prefers one religion to another. The cooperationist model is like the separationist model in the sense that it presupposes a formal separation between state and religion. However, it remains flexible, given that it does not create a strict separation between the two spheres. The separation with interaction is based on the recognition that although the state and religion are autonomous spheres, they can co-exist and interact based on the idea of freedom of religion. This freedom is the basis of the interaction between the state and religious groups and the recognition of principles such as pluralism, equality, neutrality and tolerance. Even though the state and religion may be described as separate spheres by the Constitution, there is nevertheless "a considerable degree of cooperation and interaction between the two" (Sachs 1992:6) that is based on the mutual collaboration and understanding of the respective goals and aims of each sphere. Therefore, the relations between the state and religious communities are amicable, since there is a substantial degree of accommodation and collaboration.

Religion is not discriminated against; it is instead recognised as serving the general welfare and common good of society. As Feliks Gross (1999:367) notes, the cooperationist state is distinguished by "its neutral but positive and 'cooperative' stance towards religions in society". The state remains cooperative and neutral towards the position of religious institutions and organisations in society. Although the state has a secular ideology which may or may not reflect religious sentiments, it attempts to grant freedom of religion and equal treatment towards religious and non-religious views. Thus, cooperationist regimes uphold the theory of state neutrality, regarding the contribution of both religious and non-religious views in society, since an individual or group cannot be suppressed or unfairly discriminated against.

The state grants equal status and encouragement to all religious educational facilities provided they conform to the required norms regulated by the Constitution. It also recognises and accommodates the presence of religion-based, humanitarian organisations seeking to uplift citizen standards and welfare, so contributing to the wellbeing of society. This means, there is no state or established religion that would be given priority over minority religious groups. Thus, while the separationist model perceives neutrality to mean the strict separation between religion and state, whereby religious influence is expunged from public life, cooperationist regimes employ neutrality in relation to both religious and non-religious stances. Cooperationist regimes do not ignore the role of religion in society, since the state's openness to religion recognises that religious communities have a positive role to play in society. As such, they are part of society and the public sphere. For example, religions may have an influence on policies through lobbying and engaging with the state on issues of public interest such as developmental and economic matters.

The Three Possibility that were Rejected

The nature of the relations between religious bodies and the state in South Africa is rooted in the Constitution. When the South African Constitution was being conceived, there were substantial discussions on the model that would characterise the relations between religion and state. The four possibilities discussed in the preceding section are the atheistic state, theocratic state, separationist state and cooperationist state.[34] Only the last possibility was considered as the one that would characterise the relations between state and religion in South Africa. The possibility of an atheistic state which is "hostile to religion, a state that had nothing to do with religion or did not encourage it" (Rasool 2004:99) was found to be inappropriate to the South African context. Creating an atheistic state would have been a betrayal of the diversity of the South African society, the ongoing contribution of religion and the religious nature of the country. South Africa has been and continues to be highly religious. Based on the 1996 census, the year the Constitution was promulgated, Lipton (2002:135) established that:

> *The country has a total area of 470,462 square miles and its population is approximately 43,680,000. According to the 1996 census, approximately 87 percent of the population adhere to the Christian faith. Approximately 3 percent of the population indicated that they belong to other religions, including traditional indigenous, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Rastafarianism.*

In 2013, the General Household Survey on religious affiliation found that 84.2 per cent of the population was Christian, 2 per cent was Muslim, 5 per cent belonged to traditional African religions (mainly animist, ancestral and tribal) and that 1 per cent belonged to Hinduism

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[34] Ebrahim Rasool and Albie Sachs provide a brief discussion on the four theoretical possibilities that were considered by the drafters of the Constitution. See, Rasool, E 2004. 'Religion and Politics in South Africa' in Tayob, A, Weisse, W & Chidester, D (eds). *Religion, Politics, and Identity in a Changing South Africa.* New York: Waxmann Publishing, p. 99, and Sachs, A 1992. *Religion, Education and Constitutional Law.* Cape Town: Institute for Comparative Religion in Southern Africa, p. 6-7.

(Schoeman 2017:3).[35] The statistics results also revealed that 0.2 per cent of the country's population belonged to the Jewish religion and that 0.2 per cent was atheistic and agnostic. Given the religious demographics, demonstrating that most South African citizens are religious, creating an atheist state supressing, eliminating, or allocating religion to a marginal existence would have been counterproductive. Historically, different religions and faith communities have played a central role in the public sphere. During apartheid, religions such as Islam and Christianity joined liberation movements and organised various mass protests in the struggle for liberation and freedom.

For example, Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Youth Movement, Qibla Mass Movement and Call of Islam were dominant in the fight against apartheid. In the period of transition from apartheid to democracy, various religions contributed to the process of reconciliation and creating space, where political negotiations and deliberations could take place.[36] For example, in his work *Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, Megan Shore (2009) upholds that Christianity was one of the key factors in the formation and implementation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[37] Opting for an atheist state, which suppresses religious expression and participation in public issues, would have betrayed the contribution of religion in the construction and founding of a democratic South Africa (Sachs 1992:7).[38]

The second possibility for creating a theocratic state, also thought to be an option for South Africa was found to be unsuitable for various reasons. Historically, during apartheid the South African legal system had favoured Christianity:

> *The Preamble of the 1983 Constitution, the 'Christian national' and 'Christian' education policies for white and black children (Sections 2(1)(a) of the National Education Policy Act of 1967 and 3(3) of the Education and Training Act of 1979), Section 1 of the Publications Act of 1974 and a series of laws covering Sundays and public holidays (Panel of Constitutional Experts 1995:3).*

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[35] The statistics results also revealed that 0.2 of the country's population belong to the Jewish religion, 0.2% of the population is Atheistic and agnostic.

[36] Many thinkers have produced works on the contribution of Christianity during the transition period. See, Borer, A T 1998. *Challenging the State: Churches as Political Actors in South Africa*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, p. 173; Macozoma, S 1990. *The Church and Negotiations. Standing for Truth Campaign Worksop, March 7, 1990.* Johannesburg: SACC Achieves, p. 10 and Hay, H 1998. *Ukubuyisana: Reconciliation in South Africa.* Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publication, p. 47.

[37] Megan Shore argues that Christianity was central to the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by shaping its initial mandate and functioning process. See, Shore, M 2009. *Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company.

[38] The article, *Religion and Politics: The Western Dilemma* by Raimon Penikkar offers a philosophical and sociological reflection on religion and politics. For Raimon Penikkar, the nature of the relationship between politics and religion in the West has been historically underlined by a dilemma: either the two are considered as 'mutually incompatible and antagonistic forces' or as identical. He challenges the dualistic view which limits religion to the eternal, supernatural and sacred and politics to the earthly, profane or natural. He argues contra the monism stance which perceives religion and politics as totally indistinguishable. Panikkar, R 1983. 'Religion or Politics: The Western Dilemma' in Merkl, H P & Smart, N (eds). *Religion and Politics in the Modern World*. New York: New York University Press.

Since there are many religions and customs in South Africa, any bias against a religion or religious group was eliminated. A theocratic state would have betrayed the principles of a secular state where religion and state are primarily distinct. Creating a theocratic state supresses the diversity central to South Africa as a democratic state. For example, Barney Pityana, a Christian theologian and human rights lawyer, in his address at a seminar at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, suggested that since the majority of the population is Christian, South Africa should be a Christian state (Durham 2011:364). Among the respondents were Anil Sooklal and Suleman Dangor. However, the theocratic model was never discussed in detail as a potential possibility, because it overlooks the diverse nature of South African society. Thus, a government structure that is constitutionally religious with a strong link between state and religious institutions was considered as unacceptable to the South African context (Durham 2011:364).

The third possibility was that of creating a secular state with strict separation between religious bodies and the state. Although this would have created absolute autonomy and sovereignty on both sides, it was not considered an appropriate option, partly because it would strictly consider religion as a private affair; and religious interaction between the state and society would be seriously curtailed. To secularise all state institutions and to place all religious institutions completely outside the sphere of the state was not found to be a solution for South Africa (Sachs 1992:6). The indispensable role of religion in the struggle for freedom during apartheid, its centrality in the reconciliation process and the fact that most South African citizens subscribe to a religion contradicts the creation of a strict separation between state and religion.

The South African Model

The fourth possibility that was considered and eventually adopted was that of a cooperationist state which is essentially secular but allows for interactions between the state and religion. Although the two are independent of each other, there is 'separation with interaction' and religious organisations play an active role in the public sphere. There is no 'wall of separation' between religion and the state in South Africa. At the most basic level, the idea of 'separation with interaction' means that "there is no wall of separation between religious groups and the state; interaction is encouraged, as is the input of religious groups into the formation of public policy" (Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Office 2005:4). Thus, state-religion relations have undergone modification in the new South Africa since the official adoption of the new Constitution in 1996.

The complexity underlining the relations between state and religion, especially the extent to which religious bodies can influence society and play a role in the public sphere is explicit in the discussions around freedom of religion in academia by scholars. For instance, Pieter Coertzen (2008:262) maintains that though in "1994 (1996) South Africa got a Constitution which guaranteed freedom of religion", it "does not clearly identify in detail what freedom of religion implies".[39] Given that constitutional provisions, such as sections 30(1), 14(1), 15(3),

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[39]Lourens Du Plessis discusses the relations between state and religion in South Africa from the perspective of religious freedom and based on recent development within the South African legal system. See, Du Plessis, M L

15(2) concerning religious freedom do not expound on what this entails, religions in South Africa have drafted the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms (SACRRF). Once parliament approves this Charter, law will protect the rights and freedoms of religion; and "the place of religion in South Africa will be clearer than it is in the Constitution at present" (Mutelo 2017:21). Neither has this transpired, nor is it likely to transpire in the near future.

From the time the Constitution was officially adopted in 1996, the Constitutional Court has dealt with various cases concerning the meaning of freedom of religion and its limitations.[40] Although the Constitutional Court continues its attempt to interpret the constitutional rights related to religion, the process has not been smooth, especially in cases were religious rights conflict with other rights and values. Nevertheless, as a liberal state that supports the interaction between state and both religious and non-religious organisations and institutions, South Africa exhibits the principle of neutrality. Constitutionally, the state safeguards the freedom and liberties of individuals, institutions and groups. For example, in his discussion of the concept of liberalism, Andrew Heywood (2007:46) argues that in a liberal state, individuals and groups should enjoy maximum liberty and freedom. The State, as the guardian of the general welfare of citizens, upholds impartiality in dealing with religious and irreligious groups. Regarding the position of different religions, religious pluralism and equality are central elements underlining the freedom of religion in South Africa. Piper (2007:71) stresses the notion of plurality of religions in South Africa:

> *Today the Constitution affirms all religions and not only one; the state does not promote religious purposes through law and policy; it does not restrict freedom of religion; and no religious body has any special constitutional standing.*

Based on the openness of the state to all, South Africa can be considered as a 'religiously neutral state' especially due to the dominant role of different religious organisations in politics, humanitarianism and social activism. As such, Africa is best described as a religiously neutral state rather than a secular state given that religion continues to participate in politics. Conformingly, Simangaliso Kumalo (2013:636) maintains that "South Africa is not just a religious country simply because the majority of the people are alleged to belong to some religion, but even the Constitution of the country declares it to be a religiously neutral state". Such a position is appealing given that all religions are equally respected by the state, both in the private and public spheres. Unfair discrimination against a specific religion, custom or world view "by the state or any other person, group or institution are forbidden" (Mutelo 2017:32) constitutionally, based on section 9 of the South African Constitution.

2010. 'State and Religion in South Africa: Open Issues and Recent Development' in Ferrari, S & Cristofori, R (eds). *Law and Religion in the 21st Century: Relations Between States and Religious Communities.* Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company.

[40] The cases that have been dealt with by the Constitutional Court concerning the meaning of freedom of religion and its limitations include the *De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time Being and Another* (CCT223/14) [2015] ZACC 35) / [2015] ZACC 35; *Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another* (CCT 60/04) [2005] ZACC 19) / [1 SA 524 [2006]; *Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education* [2000 (4) SA 757 (CC)] and *Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape and others* [(2002 2 SA 794 (cc)].

The openness of the Constitution enables religious organisations to interact with the state in issues of nation building; the democratisation process and the process of making and implementing certain policies. In the democratic South Africa, religions such as Christianity and Islam have created several organisations that have been able to engage within the public sphere, thereby making substantial contributions to society. Religions such as Christianity and Islam in post-apartheid South Africa have been part of broader interfaith organisations, which represent major faiths, and who also interact with government on specific issues. Interfaith solidarity has helped Islam and other faith communities in South Africa to collaborate not only among themselves, but also with the government on public issues. After 1994, President Nelson Mandela spearheaded the creation of the National Religious Leaders Forum (NRLF), a nationwide interreligious organisation that was formed by several religious groups including Muslims. When the NRLF met, both the MJC of South Africa and the Council of Muslim Theologians (Jamiat al-Ulama) Gauteng were well represented at national level (Omar 1998:2). The major aim of this interfaith organisation was to collaborate with the ANC government on diverse issues relating to development and the moral reconstruction of the country.

Through the formation of interfaith organisations such as NRLF after the demise of apartheid, "religious bodies became development arms of government service delivery initiatives" (Kumalo 2013:638). Such efforts reaffirm the idea that religious organisations are welcomed to play a role in the broader South African society. The NRLF engaged in several consultations and discussions with the state and government officials on various issues geared towards nation building or developmental initiatives, governance and the new democracy which was developing. At a summit with religious leaders in 1997, Nelson Mandela addressed the NRLF saying:

> *The transformation of our country requires the greatest possible cooperation between religious and political bodies, critically and wisely serving our people together. Neither political nor religious objectives can be achieved in isolation. They are held in a creative tension with common commitments. We are partners in the building of our society (African National Congress Parliamentary Caucus, 2010).*

In 1997, the National Religious Association for Social Development (NRASD) was formed for further collaboration between the state and various religions in South Africa. The NRASD has since remained a "network of religious groups with the aim of fostering the role of religious organisations in social development projects" (National Religious Association for Social Development, 2018). In 2009, Ray McCauley, a Christian Pastor, spearheaded the formation of the National Interfaith Leadership Council (NILC), which maintained close links with the ANC government. In 2011, the NRLF and the NILC merged to form the National Interfaith Council of South Africa (NICSA). The organisation was formed to collaborate with the government on diverse social, economic and political issues. Since its formation, NICSA has been working with the government on nation building initiatives and issues of public policy and development thereby indicating that the input of religious organisations is welcomed in South African politics. This also shows that NICSA continues to have a political voice in South Africa through its focus on issues of public policy, human rights, governance, service delivery and development in its political engagement.

Constitutional Guarantees of Religious Rights

In a democratic South Africa, the 1996 Constitution is the basis and foundation for the relations between religious institutions, the state, society and the public. The Constitution contains several stipulations concerning rights that explicitly and implicitly relate to religion and its parameters as a general limitation of the freedom of religion. In the pre-1994 South Africa, the concept of toleration of religions and other faith groups existed with some Christian denominations dominating through close links with the state. For example, the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* held a favourable status since it initially offered a theological basis as justification for certain apartheid policies, such as the doctrine of separate development, resulting in the intensification of racial classification and segregation.[41] Hennie Serfontein (1982:71) summarises the position of the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* during the apartheid political dispensation:

> *Virtually blind support of the government in all its policies and actions; blind support for apartheid political principles, apart from minor criticisms of details of application; a golden rule that nothing must be said or done to "embarrass" or "confront" the government; the maintenance of special liaison machinery and committees through which the NGK, without any fuss and publicity, could be in contact with the government or government departments.*

With reference to the dominance of certain Christian values pre-1994, Lourens du Plessis (2001:439) contends that the traditional Christian bias in South African law was apparent in many ways. He highlights the existence of laws concerning, for example, the Sunday observance; the "Christian form of the oath in criminal proceedings; and a constitutional confession of faith in section 2 of the 1983 Constitution as well as statements showing a bias for Christianity, as understood by Afrikaner Calvinists, in its preamble" (Du Plessis 2001:439).[42] The legal system furthermore attempted to prioritise a Calvinistic Christian perspective in law, such as legal censorship.[43]

In the new South Africa, the Constitution defines the general place of religion through the guarantees of religious and related rights that apply to all religions. Regarding the right to religious freedom, section 15(1) of the Constitution resolutely states that "everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion". This clause is in accord

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[41] Nscokovane provides a detailed discussion on the close relationship between the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* and the apartheid state under the NP. See, Nscokovane, C 1989. *Demons of Apartheid: A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the NGK, NP and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*. Braamfontein: Skotaville Publishers, p. 39; and Serfontein, J P H 1982. *Apartheid Change and the NG Kerk*. Emmarentia: Taurus Publications, p. 71.

[42] Thinkers such as Johan van der Vyver offer a substantial discussion on the affirmed bias and some of its major effects. See, Van der Vyver, J D 1999. Constitutional Perspective of Church-State Relations in South Africa. *Brigham Young University Law Review* (2)8, 635-673, p. 636-642.

[43] In the case of censorship legislation, the notion of blasphemy was perceived as criteria though it reaffirmed the centrality of Christian values and principles.

with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which according to Ninan Koshy (1992:22) stipulates:

> *Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in a community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.*

Fundamentally, both the South African Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights place the freedoms of religion, thought and conscience on an equal footing without explicit or implicit discrimination. This reaffirms the values of equality and the principle of religious liberty that are also found in sections 15(2) and 15(3) of the South African Constitution. Regarding the freedom of religion in academic institutions, section 15(2) permits religious observances provided such conduct is based on unbiased grounds; free and unbiased attendance at such functions; and non-violation of the principles of the relevant public authorities.[44] Without tackling the complex question of religious values and observances in religious, academic institutions,[45] it is essential to note that section 29(3) grants everyone the "right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent educational institutions" considering relevant provisions. Furthermore, section 15(3)*(a)* recognises marriages conducted under religious systems, family law, personal law or any tradition on the condition that other constitutional provisions are followed and observed. Under this clause, only a marriage that is solemnised by a marriage officer appointed by the state is recognised. Moreover, section 31(1) of the Constitution enshrines the freedom of religious, linguistic and cultural communities regarding the actual formation, practice and preservation of respective values and beliefs:

> *Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community - (a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.*

The affirmed rights are to be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the provisions of the Constitution enshrined in the Bill of Rights.[46] The guarantees of religious rights are also contained in the constitutional stipulations on political rights. According to section 9(1), everyone has the right to make political choices; form or join a political party; campaign for a

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[44] Section 15(2) of the Constitution states that "religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that – (a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities; (b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and (c) attendance at them is free and voluntary".

[45] Many thinkers have explored the place of Christian values and observance in religious schools and state-aided academic institutions. See Mestry, R 2006. 'The Constitutional Right to Freedom of Religion in South African Primary Schools'. *Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education* (12) 2, 57–68; and Mawdsleya, R D, Cumming, J J & de Waal, E 2008. Building a nation: religion and values in the public schools of the USA, Australia, and South Africa. *Education and the Law* (20)2, 83-106. There have also been many Constitutional Court decrees that have dealt with the subject such as *De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time Being and Another* (CCT223/14) [2015] ZACC 35) / [2015] ZACC 35; *Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another* (CCT 60/04) [2005] ZACC 19) / [1 SA 524 [2006]; *Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education* [2000 (4) SA 757 (CC)]; and *Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape and others* [(2002 2 SA 794 (cc)].

[46] Section 31(2) of the Constitution.

political party; and vote for their chosen party.[47] Such political rights grant both religious and non-religious groups, organisations, institutions and individuals' freedom of political participation and engagements in society, leading to the formation of several religious, political parties in a democratic South Africa. However, the constitutional stipulations on religious rights and freedoms ought to be understood and interpreted from the broader perspective of South African law, including the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and the ongoing legal negotiations and development of legislation. Lourens Du Plessis (2010:17) asserts:

> *The South African law on state and religion is embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as prime source; in the common law knowable from (and developed through) case law; in legislation, and in administrative/policy directives.*

Although the Constitution as the supreme law of the land stipulates general rights related to religion, such rights could only be fully understood from the perspective of certain constitutional limitations and the ongoing interpretation of rights and freedoms by legal platforms. The constitutional guarantees and protection of the values and rights including "those relating to religion can be examined and reinterpreted in accordance with the limitation clause (Section 36)" (Mutelo 2017:23). Under section 36(1), the limitation clause stipulates:

> *The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonably (reasonable)? and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors …*

In limiting the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, the relevant factors that should be considered include "the nature of the rights"; the necessity giving rise to limitations; the presupposed link between the reason for the limitation and the limitation itself; the degree or scope and nature of the limitation; and the most possible and reasonable way to undertake the limitation.[48] Section 36(2) of the limitation clause upholds that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights may not be limited, except based on the limitations stipulated in section 36(1) and other related constitutional provisions. For example, in executing its rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, religious rights may not be exercised in such a way that any other provisions, rights and liberties are violated.

Based on the constitutional guarantees of religious rights, religious institutions and associations may have a role to play in society. The South African Constitution mandates the state to safeguard the common welfare of citizens; this sometimes involves a certain amount of limitation on the involved values and rights based on the constitution itself and jurisprudence (Gray 1995:77). This affirmation considers the stipulations of the limitation clause and other related provisions. While advocating for diversity and pluralism of cultures, religions, linguistic communities, world views, beliefs and opinions, the state somewhat limits rights and freedoms,

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[47] Section 9(1) of the South African Constitution states that "(1) Every citizen is free to make political choices, which include(s) the right to – (a) form a political party; (b) participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; and (c) campaign for a political party or cause".

[48] Section 36(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Constitution.

in a fair and justifiable way, in the pursuit of the common good. This does not only enable the state to ensure the existence of equal liberty for all, but it also ensures 'freedom under law' (Heywood 2007:46), so that fundamental constitutional rights may be exercised and applied in a manner consistent with other liberties and freedoms.

Such observations and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom indicate why the South African model of separation with interaction encourages the involvement of religion in social, moral, political and economic issues facing the country. The model is based on the values of democracy and the constitutional guarantees of religious and related rights. As such, it is because of such constitutional openness and the flexible relationship between religion and state in South Africa that the religious organisations have been able to participate in South Africa's public sphere. Such positive political participation can be considered as both a constitutional right and a positive contribution to South Africa's democracy.[49] Religions such as Christianity and Islam have in some cases opted to support the government where the policies and laws are in line with the religious ethos and constitutional values. As argued, such involvement is rooted in the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and the flexible relationship between religion and state. The same accommodationist conditions inspired the formation of interreligious organisations such as the National Religious Leaders Forum (NRLF), the National Religious Association for Social Development (NRASD) and the National Interfaith Leadership Council (NILC).

Conclusion

The article argued that the South African model of state-religion relations is based on the principle of 'separation with interaction.' Although the state and religious bodies are primarily autonomous, they interact on certain social, political and economic issues. In post-apartheid South Africa, the openness of the Constitution has become the basis for religious participation in public issues and engagement with the government. Generally, the constitutional provisions on religious freedom have given various religions a framework upon which to interact with the government and maintain political influence in the country. Thus, the public role which religious organisations continue to play in the new South Africa is not only based on the state-religion model which upholds principled cooperation between the state and religious bodies but also on the constitutional stipulations on religious freedom and other related rights.

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[49] Some religious organisations have found themselves affirming the government in its positive nation building programs and policies while criticizing it in cases where constitutional values are violated, and injustices perpetuated.

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From Pan-Africanism to Pro-Africanism:
A Critical Review of the Ideology of Pan-Africanism with a Fresh Proposal

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Abstract

Despite the lofty ideals on which Pan-Africanism was conceived over a hundred years ago, it has not led to a more secure Africa with a remarkable ethics of brotherhood and cooperation. Hence post-colonial Africa has recorded over a hundred wars with other illustrations of chaos and disorder. A plausible interpretation is either that Pan-Africanism does not square up to the demands of modern-day Africa or that the implementation of the ideology is faulty. The work adopts the first position and sets out to interrogate the ideals on which Pan-Africanism functions in post-colonial Africa. The central argument of the paper is that Africa's post-colonial challenges has strong internal demands that reinforce the external challenges and that without addressing the internal roots of these challenges by rethinking Pan-Africanism the challenges will persist. It proposes Pro-Africanism (defined as supportive Africanism) as a more viable ideology.

Introduction

Despite the lofty ideals on which pan-Africanism was conceived over a hundred years ago, it has not led to a more secure Africa or an ethic of brotherhood and cooperation. Africa still witnesses more inter-state and intra-state wars than other regions of the world. In socio-economic terms, Africa still harbours the most insecure citizens of the world, because society cannot guarantee their peace and well-being. She has more wandering refugees and illegal immigrants than other country. The implication is that either the ideology does not square up to the demands of modern-day Africa, or that implementation of the ideology is faulty. This work adopts the first position and sets out to interrogate the ideals on which pan-Africanism functions in post-colonial Africa. The central argument of the paper is that Africa's post-colonial challenge has more internal demands than external demands and that the external demands have strong internal roots, which pan-Africanism is not in a position to tackle. The paper therefore maps out and explains these internal challenges, with the argument that whereas pan-Africanism served to galvanise forces that led to decolonisation in Africa, the internal challenges of post–colonial Africa (which amount to Africa's internal hegemony or self-colonisation) cannot be solved by pan-Africanism. It argues that addressing these challenges

through the ideology of pan-Africanism without the effort to understand, engage and productively negotiate African differences will be counter-productive.

> *At the thirtieth anniversary grand finale conference of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), held in Dakar Senegal in 2003 (but published in 2005), two African scholars - Hannington Ochwada and Ngugi wa Thiong'o - articulated strong views that point to a need to review the ideology of pan-Africanism. According to Ochwada, the cultural and economic marginalisation that Africa currently experiences make it urgent 'to revisit the role of nationalism and pan-Africanism in debates and discourse on the African condition'* [Ochwada 2005:201]

Similarly, Ngugi wa Thiong'o submitted that pan-Africanism should not be built on Euro-memory of Africa or the relationship between African 'heads of states or that of the intellectual and western-educated elite held together by their common inheritance of European languages' [Wa Thiong'o.2005:162]. These are strong positions that urge a critical review of the long-standing ideology of pan-Africanism. What my work has set out to do is further this critical scholarship and add to a critical literature on pan-Africanism, by looking at some vital challenges of post-colonial Africa and establishing if pan-Africanism can address these challenges.

The work does not seek to undermine the need for 'pan-African solidarity' [Ade Ajayi 2001:47] 'solidarity itself being a moral ethic in the African world. What it has set out to do is to examine the kind of solidarity Africans should demand from themselves in post-colonial Africa and the ideological basis on which they should seek such solidarity. Through a critique of pan-Africanism in this regard, I then state what I consider to be a more viable ideology for African development and an African future - one that will capture the need for African solidarity, yet guarantee some of the ideals that, even though implied by pan-Africanism, cannot be realised through it, to attain social stability and quality growth and development for Africa. This, I capture under the term Pro-Africanism.

By Pro-Africanism, I mean supportive African ethics or supportive Africanism, that is, affording the Africans as much mental and material resources as is possible to develop and advance the quality of African life, by allowing him or her to be the best that he/she can be through his/her natural human endowments. Pro-Africanism is a position that holds that the different socio-cultural and socio-political blocks of Africans operating as nation-states or ethnic nationalities should support each other to exploit the benefits of their intellectual and cultural resources, in order to seek growth and development in ways that will favour them best and under different frameworks as may be favourable to their historical and cultural contexts but not under a uniform measure and framework. This could then attract greater interest from those in favour of African re-birth globally, especially development agents and enthusiasts who could be attracted to the project and who could identify with the desires of African people in terms of their specific nature and demands. Arising from this, we could have a co-ordinated body of Pro-Africanists with ideas, theories, policies, programmes and principles that specifically respond to African needs in a way that will favour a given group of people. This, in my estimation, is what could lead to the emergence of an African super-power (interpreted

to mean a strong and coordinated body of African nationals that function in a state that is comparatively strong and significant to the larger human community and can defend pro-African interests).

A basic view I hold, and which drives my criticism of pan-Africanism, is that, at the moment, Africans lack cognitive unity, that is, a shared worldview formulated through the language and structures of African modernity. Thus, in view of what Kwame Nkrumah has called 'the crisis of African conscience' (itself the result of the different foreign interventions in African history); and the poverty of the intellectual resources and capital to coordinate and address issues at a pan-African level; the path to African development in its modern demands might not lie in this direction but on how to encourage any unit of Africa to convert the potentials of its cultural and natural resources and its reservoir of knowledge to an African advantage for which she deserves the support of others.

The work suggests that there is a need to re-think and re-ground Africa's future on the strength, potential and values of African differences and to support the growth of the relevant intellectual and cultural ideals that these differences defend, especially those that are relevant to the flowering of African humanity. In other words, mine is pan-Africanism turned upside down, in the sense that what my position advocates is the need to seek an African family from within and not to move to the smaller units or levels of Africa from without, as implied by pan-Africanism. The work is in three parts and I shall: (i) discuss the substance of pan-Africanism; (ii) provide a critique of the idea by articulating the ideological deficiencies of pan-Africanism in post-colonial Africa; (iii) articulate the idea of pro-Africanism and its promises.

The Substance of Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism is a galvanising movement and ideology that emphasises the sameness and oneness of the African family in seeking to provide a framework for unity and the growth of African peoples. Initiated in Paris in 1891 by W.E.B. Du Bois, this movement is anchored in a racial consciousness of the African identity. The ideologies hold that the destiny of African people's world over are interlinked and that efforts made to improve the lot of Africans on one front must be aimed at improving the lot of Africans elsewhere. The ideals of this movement can be summarised in the words of Sekou Toure, the Guinean political icon, whose famous ideology for democratic governance in Guinea held that '... Africa should be considered like the human body: when a finger is cut off, the whole body suffers'. Other pioneers of pan-Africanism include Marcus Garvey, Wallace Johnson, George Padmore, Ras Makonnen, Kwame Nkrumah (first president of Ghana), Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Patrice Lumumba, first Prime Minister of Congo, etc. The latest efforts to sustain the ideals of pan-Africanism include the Pan-African Congress held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on June 19-27, 1974, and periodic publication of Third World First, and numerous important publications and journals on pan-African studies, such as the *Pan-African Movement Newsletter*.

In the effort to establish the basic ideas and values that define pan-Africanism, my views will be grounded on the ideology of sub-Saharan (black) African pan-Africanism. As properly captured by Ali Mazrui, there are several kinds of pan-Africanism:

First, there is sub-Saharan Pan-Africanism, an assertion of solidarity among black Africans south of the Sahara. Secondly, there is trans-Saharan Pan-Africanism, emphasizing the links between Africa south and north of the Sahara (The Organization of African Unity is based on the principle of trans-Saharan Pan-Africanism). Thirdly, there is Trans-Atlantic Pan-Blackism, constituting links between Africa South of the Sahara and the Black Diaspora, the solidarity of shared blackness is extended to black Americans, West Indians, black Brazilians, and other black people in the Western hemisphere. Fourthly, there is Tran-Atlantic Pan-Africanism, bringing together the black diaspora in the western Hemisphere with all Africans in the continent, both black and Arab. (Mazrui,1979:26)

I am applying sub-Saharan pan-Africanism because this is where the ideology has produced its most significant gains and impact, as evident in the current drive for a United States of Africa. I am also applying Sub-Saharan Africa because this is where the ideology has manifested its serious challenges in post-colonial Africa. Finally, I submit that most of the challenges I apply to illustrate the problems of pan-Africanism are drawn from the post-colonial phase of Africa's development.

In an attempt to articulate the ideals of sub-Saharan pan-Africanism, I shall rely on the views of three African leaders, who, to a large extent, can be said to be important advocates of the idea, and with whom the idea finds adequate expression. These are: Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Kenneth Kaunda. In relying on their positions to discuss the ideals that define pan-Africanism as an ideology, I do not deny that the idea of pan-Africanism pre-dates their emergence on the African political scene. I only wish to draw on the fact that their views express the maturation of the idea after what could be called the infancy stage of the idea: the period during which it served merely as a blue-print in Africa's search for an ideology that would define the African future and direct the march to that future. As Nkrumah himself wrote:

The expression Pan-Africanism did not come into use until the beginning of the twentieth century when Henry Sylvester Williams of Trinidad and William Edward Burghardt Dubois of the United State of America, both of African descent, used it at several Pan-African Conferences which were mainly attended by scholars of African descent of the New World. (Nkrumah 1963:26)

While there were several forums convened to articulate issues that addressed the concerns of Africans, in general, and which later served as the blue-print for pan-Africanism (first in 1919 in Paris, second in 1921 in London, third in 1923 in London, fourth in 1927 in New York, and fifth in 1945 in Manchester), it is important to note that pan-Africanism 'really took concrete expression at the fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester in 1945' (G.C.M. Mutiso & S.W. Rohio.p.1980,*ibid;*p.341). To further articulate clearly what stands to be regarded as the basic philosophy of pan-Africanism, let me discuss the outcome of this conference and how it is reflected in the thoughts of the African leaders mentioned.

The basic idea of the Manchester Congress of 1945, where pan-Africanism took its roots, was the need to achieve a Pan-African nationalism that would serve as the basis for African nationalism, that is, an African nationalism that would direct the cry for independence in Africa and serve the cause of liberation of African people from the shackles of colonialism. This agenda is demonstrated in the action taken by Kwame Nkrumah and George Padmore, who served as secretaries to this conference and soon after worked to bring Pan-Africanism to the African continent, where, according to them, 'it really belongs'*(ibid* p.342*)*. While the preceding conferences of similar intentions permitted foreign powers to govern the peoples of Africa, specifying the terms of such governance, in particular the need for the peoples of Africa to be governed with fairness and justice, the 1945 Manchester Congress made very specific demands regarding the need for self-governance and declared "We affirm the right of all colonial peoples to control their own destiny. All colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic. (Nkrumah 1963)

With this basic demand for freedom and independence, we can then see the inner force according to which Pan-Africanism functioned at the out-set. Other principles that define the pan-African project can be found in the views of selected African leaders, as indicated. Let me now highlight them.

For Nkrumah, the idea of Pan-Africanism can be summarised in the need for 'a continental government for Africans' (ibid p.345) and 'the need to maintain a common currency' (ibid). This included the establishment of a unified military and defence strategy, and the need to adopt a unified foreign policy and diplomacy to give political direction to their 'joint efforts for the protection and economic development of our continent' *(*ibid). Nkrumah's position was anchored in the belief that:

> *We [Africans] need the strength of our combined numbers and resources to protect ourselves from the very positive dangers of returning colonialism in disguised forms. We need it to combat the entrenched force dividing our continent and still holding back millions of our brothers. We need it to secure total African liberation. We need it to carry forward our construction of a socio-economic system that will support the great mass of our steadily rising population at levels of life which will compare with those in the most advanced countries (ibid, p.344).*

Nkrumah's vision of Pan-Africanism is anchored in the need for an 'inward look into the African continent for all aspects of its development' (ibid, p.345). For Julius Nyerere, another prominent African leader, the need for Pan-Africanism arises from the fact that he considers 'each of the African states to be weak in relation to the outside world and dependent, if allowed to interact with the larger world on its own. Thus, his theory of Pan-Africanism arises from the need to create a powerful centre that would be vested with some powers to protect and direct the future of each state. For Nyerere:

> *The objective of unity demands that an all-African body should have power in certain vital matters. And that the constituent parts of Africa should cease to have power in these matters. In relation to the outside world, there must be just one authority in Africa.* (Nyerere 1996:329)

Nyerere's idea of Pan-Africanism is anchored in the need to create 'one source of ultimate power as far as non-African powers are concerned' (ibid). For this reason, he recommends that Pan-Africanism should imply the 'cessation of natural sovereignties' and its replacement 'by the sovereignty of Africa as a single unit, incorporating all the separate units' (ibid). In practice, Pan-Africanism should translate into 'African self-policing', 'a common market', 'a single currency' and 'free trade' *(ibid)*. Thus, the substance of Nyerere's theory is a demand for a form of Pan-Africanism that would lead to 'a continent-wide state, single and indivisible'(ibid).

Nyerere supports this statement with the view that there is already a form of emotional unity in Africa that finds expression in the concept of 'African personality', (ibid, p.334). But, in his view (ibid*)*, this emotional unity should be allowed to express itself in a more realistic manner, through strong economic and political unity, which will lead to a United States of Africa. This, he believes, should lead to 'unity of action together with the greatest possible degree of local self-expression on things which affect only that locality', (ibid) for, as he puts it, 'only with unity can we be sure that African resources will be used for the benefit of Africa'. (ibid, p.335) Nyerere goes forward to map out strategies to achieve the idea. One of these is the formation of a 'loose association of states' among African states and the 'constant exchange of visits' (ibid) by heads of state of associating states. He advocates the formation of an East African Federation of States comprising Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, which he considers 'comparatively easy to achieve' (ibid) as a beginning.

The idea of Pan-Africanism suggested by Kenneth Kaunda demands more rigour than that of the two leaders discussed above. Kaunda suggests the principles that should define the Pan-African project of unity with a critical stand that the idea of Pan-Africanism should not be built on what he calls 'fond illusions' (ibid, p.348).

He rejects the assumption that the desire for freedom in Africa, as reflected in the Manchester Conference, amounts to a collective desire for unity, and backs this position with the example of the position of the first Nigerian Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, who, in 1960, when Nigeria gained independence, said that 'Nigeria has not the slightest intention of surrendering her sovereignty, no sooner has she gained independence, to anyone else …' (ibid). Kaunda's view, arising from this position, is that while the project of Pan-Africanism may be desirable, erecting such a bond of unity may not be fruitful without an attempt to dialogue with the components of the desired union. Kaunda (ibid) recommends that such unity should be founded on dialogue and evolution of ideas that define the African person so as to achieve what could be called a Pan-African morality. Without such morality, that is, a shared ethical worldview that regulates a common value, the unity desired by the project would not be feasible and productive. As a step towards the achievement of such a moral and intellectual base for this idea, Kaunda endorses the recommendation of Haile Selassie, one-time Emperor of Ethiopia, that there is a need to set up an African university where 'the future leaders of Africa can be trained in an atmosphere of continental brotherhood'. (ibid, p.349) At such a university:

> *... the supra-national aspects of African life would be emphasized, and study would be directed towards the ultimate goal of complete African unity. (ibid, p.349)*

As implied by the above citation, such a university would raise Africans who would be educated to see Africa wholly and to see it steadily. From among the products of such a university, the

idea of Pan-Africanism could gain relevance. After this short discussion of the basic tenets of pan-Africanism, let me now turn to the next task – that of presenting what I consider to be the problems with the idea. It is based on these that I shall propose a review of the ideology of Pan-Africanism.

Critiquing Pan-Africanism

A summary of the concept of Pan-Africanism prevalent in the views of the three leaders mentioned shows that it is aimed at the formation of a higher and stronger governmental force than those of different states of Africa, that would direct the affairs of African states and protect Africa from undue hegemony from the imperial world. Such a higher force would serve to moderate the activities, policies and programmes of independent African states by appealing to the spirit of an assumed African brotherhood that pre-dates the emergence of the states. This, it was believed, would make the states less vulnerable to foreign imperial forces that would attempt to intervene in the attainment of the desired freedom and progress of these states. Thus, it could be said that 'development is the ultimate goal of Pan-Africanism' [Chumbow 2005:165] and that Pan-Africanism translates into unity, solidarity, security, and empowerment.

This position appears attractive, especially in the light of the youthful stage of the decolonisation process in Africa at the time that Pan-Africanism was conceived as the ideological response to the challenge of decolonisation and modernisation. It could be held that the ideology provided a platform for galvanising the efforts of Africans, which led to the movement for decolonisation and independence. Thus, apart from the fact that it led to a form of self-consciousness among Africans, 'the origins of pan-Africanism and the origins of modern black intellectualism are interlinked'. [Mazrui (2005:73]. Pan-Africanism inspired and led African leaders to form the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which has been described as 'institutionalised Pan-Africanism'. (ibid, *p.76*). The many achievements of that OAU, which include moderation of tension between African states and providing a platform for sharing ideas on the African state, cannot be covered by this piece. However, it should be noted that much of its achievements relate to the decolonisation project in Africa.

But crucial questions remain: If Pan-Africanism played this role during the era of decolonisation has it played the same or similar roles in post-colonial Africa? What are the basic challenges that confront post-colonial Africa? Are the challenges majorly external or more external than internal for which Pan-Africanism is still the most desirable option to address the challenge? To address these questions, it is important to note that since the transformation of the OAU into the African Union, much of the achievement of the union has been the formation of the New Partnership for African Development and some 'parliamentary aspirations and shared judicial ambitions' (ibid, p.76) in addition to the formation of African Union troops for peace keeping reasons. These are no doubt significant measures, but it would seem that there are more fundamental problems affecting Africa, which are not properly conceived because of the pan-African outlook. Some of these problems stand at the bedrock of the challenges that affect the African Union - which is the contemporary (post-colonial) institutional framework

for Pan-Africanism. Let me map out these challenges and discuss them in order to highlight the need to rethink Pan-Africanism.

Three outstanding issues confront post-colonial Africa and have led to uncoordinated mental and material resources that should be harnessed to serve the African humanity reliably (at least drawing from the Nigerian experience where this author has experienced, researched and intuitively engaged the African situation). These issues which are basically entrenched in the thought schemes and the internal affairs of Africans are the challenges of: mental decolonisation; the conflict between political morality and economic morality; and the challenge of the socio-cultural-cum-psychological complex. Let me articulate these problems and demonstrate how they remain crucial to the political well-being of Africa and why I think that Pan-Africanism is not in a position to address them. I will argue that these problems demand the realization of what I have called 'rational kingdom'(Ugwuanyi 2013:48) i.e. an intellectual structure driven by African/Africanized values and principles-something more fundamental than the political kingdom postulated by Kwame Nkrumah, and that pan-Africanism does not serve the purpose of this kingdom.

Decolonisation implies a conscious effort to interrogate, destroy, negate and displace the socio-cultural structures Africa has inherited from colonialism, with a view to promoting the emergence of alternative structures rooted in African cultural heritage. These structures include language, religion, education, politics, economy, society and family. These structures defend and promote values and ideals that are antithetical to Africa's well-being, in the sense that they generate doubt, hatred and contempt for the African personality and, by doing so, imply that Africa's cultural development demands total rejection of African cultural values. Mental decolonisation is the effort to achieve a clear picture of things by negating the colonial heritage, so as to ensure that our ideas are co-natural with the endogenous provisions of the African world. It is how to ensure that there are adequate grounds for accepting or rejecting any idea, concept or value and that this does not undermine the capacity to recreate these in the way that favours the autonomy of the individual.

Two important African thinkers - Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Kwasi Wiredu - have demonstrated the justification and need for decolonising the African mind. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o (1986) suggests decolonising the African mind through an African language, while Kwasi Wiredu (1995) suggests decolonising the African mind by contrasting African concepts with western concepts. With these positions, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o and Kwasi Wiredu believe that linguistic autonomy and conceptual freedom are crucial elements in the liberation process and should therefore constitute the direction in Africa's search for cultural renewal.

The second item that constitutes a crucial challenge in post-colonial Africa is the conflict between political economy and moral economy in Africa, which can be extended to imply conflict between political morality and economic morality. By political economy I mean how economy is influenced by state structures; and by moral economy I mean how the economy is made to serve human ends fulfil the demands of human well-being. This challenge can be interpreted to imply the need for a viable and reliable political state and fair ethics in wealth generation and distribution; it arises from the arbitrary nature of African states, as many modern African states are in truth unworthy contracts, founded by non-Africans and sustained by non-

African wills and wishes, which has not enjoyed a paradigm shift several years after independence. As a result, many modern African states qualify being called rogue states. By this I mean a weapon for mischief, deceit and misappropriation of the human potential, mostly by multi-nationals from Western countries who run the state with, and through, African comprador bourgeoisie. In post-colonial Africa, there is often a greater attachment to the political advantage of resource sharing than resource creation and quality citizenship; this, to a large extent, could be said to account for the protracted problems of the state in modern Africa. Thus, it could be said that the African state, as Achille Mbembe [2001:13] puts it, got its birth through the accumulative principle of violence which has made the violence of rights (as against the duty of rights) a prominent vice in African modernity for which the moral, social and political violence of African states add to constitute a cardinal challenge in post-colonial Africa. Since these challenges are significantly moral there is the need to doubt whether the current idea of the state in Africa, which has its roots in the western theory of the state where Plato (*The Republic* 389a-e, p.71) recommended that 'the philosopher-king can tell lies' and Machiavelli [1985] a later prominent theorist of the state recommended that 'the leader can exhibit the character of a lion and fox at the same time,' can fit into the demands of the African world. In Africa, being human has 'a normative component' [Wiredu 2004:20] and the question of moral maturity is a necessary condition for being a person, just as the state is a pact between the living and the dead. These views suggest that the African state deserves to achieve a paradigm shift to play its desired role in African life.

The third challenge that defines post-colonial Africa amounts to a socio-cultural-cum-psychological complex. It arises from the cultural tension that defines interaction between Africans, first among sub-Saharan Africans, and second between Africans of Arab extraction and Africa south of the Sahara. Among black Africans, the context of self-understating is still a major problem as a result of which they incline very easily to ethno-cultural cleavages for self-understanding and in doing so are not able to demarcate the line between the demands of a cultural world and the demands of the state.

Owing to this disconnection, dominance and fierce rivalry dominate the political sociology of the state and the demand for equity, tolerance and equality are downplayed. At the continental level, a certain religious tension exists between Arab Africans, especially between those of the Islamic faith and the Bantu-Africans, such that religion remains the basis of identity and contestation that impedes the idea of framework for post-colonial African co-operation and coordination. For instance, a sizeable litany of what can be called violent *jihaddism* has been unleashed in Bantu-Africa in recent times, with inspiration, cooperation and support drawn from Arab Africans, who are determined to Arabize all Bantu-Africans. Although this cannot be said to be a universal endorsement of the Islamic ethics the fact that these are carried out by Africans against their supposed fellow Africans present a curious concern to the pan-African idea.

The net result of these post-colonial challenges and mega-African challenges is a persisting crisis that affects development in Africa, and the result being that by 2003 sub-Saharan Africa, with about 650 million people, had a combined GDP somewhat smaller than that of Belgium (with a population of 10 million) [Radu 2003]. In 2005, while about 300,000 African professionals were working in Europe and America, Africa spent about USD4 billion per year

importing 100,000 foreign professionals [Karioki 2005:20-25]. By 2011, the number had increased, and Africa was losing 'more than 23,000 professionals annually while it expends US$4 billion on the services of 100,000 consultants and advisers' [Ihonvbere 2011: 3].

> *... at the beginning of the new millennium, Africa was the poorest, most technology-backward, most politically unstable, most crisis-ridden, most-indebted, and most foreign-dominated and exploited, as well as the most marginal continent in the world. Foreign debt represents up to 80 percent of GDP in net present value terms in most countries, inflation rates average between 12 and 45 percent, unemployment rates (excluding the informal sector) range between 12 and 25 percent, while the savings rate in Africa is the lowest in the world. As well, 15 of the world's 20 most impoverished nations are in Africa, with over 3 million refugees and 18 million internally displaced persons. It is estimated by international agencies that over 250 million Africans lack access to potable water, while over 200 million have no opportunities to access basic health services. More than 2 million children die before the first year, over 150 million youth are illiterate, and almost half of rural females do not attend formal schools.*

Thus, it might just be apt to adopt the view of Theophilius Okere [2004:4-5] another African scholar:

> *Africa is looking like a basket case. The entire map ... is littered with debris of rogue states, failed governments, violent successions ... and villains and victims, violently repressed secessions, interminable wars, interminable rows of wandering refugees, endemic diseases, endemic poverty, hopeless debt burdens, ugly slums, desperate recourse to religion and magic, massive unemployment for youth. And for this reason, Africa leads the world in virtually every form of crime against good governance, child soldiers, child amputees, child labour, mass graves from forgotten but enduring civil wars, mass graves from the epidemics of ebola, lassa fever, and now AIDS, not to forget malaria, our perpetual scourge.*

In the light of these challenges the questions that should be asked are: What can be held to be a solution to these problems; and how can be it be held that pan-Africanism can solve them? I locate these problems in what I call the absence of a rational kingdom in Africa. By rational kingdom, I mean a state where ideas, ideals and values implied and generated by the African worldview do not provide the basis for state ethics, and where the state is significantly alien and represents the wishes of effectively colonised minds. Whereas 'the state grows out of the nature of the individual' [Stumpf 1989:71] and constitutions on which states find their legitimacy '… must result from the preponderance of certain characters which draw the rest of the community in their wake', (ibid) the idea of the state in Africa must reflect the cultural and social ideals of the African world. Whereas constitutional and state ideals must be founded on relevant social ideals of socio-political structures erected by the people through the social values of the community, the outcome of the state project in Africa has not reflected this reliably.

The next is question to address is how it can be said that Pan-Africanism is in a position to address these challenges? Does Pan-Africanism have sufficiently strong intellectual roots and foundations to address these problems? I argue that pan-Africanism does not have this foundation, because it does not amount to a scientific political theory or a product of knowledge that enjoys inner human drive, such as one that can be rooted in human nature or desire. Beyond its potential to suggest the basis for collective identity and pride that can resist physical aggression, it does not have the capacity to generate some forceful and impactful knowledge that can lead to development. It functions merely as a theory of unity; but unity in essence is not an intellectual principle, but a circumstantial principle of need.

When people are united, they are prepared to face a common enemy. But there can also be a form of unity that favours the enemy. This can be illustrated with the form of unity aimed at conquering a physical enemy who may be more tactical and strategic. In confronting such an enemy through the ethics of unity; (a) everybody has to be carried along; (b) the interest of everybody has to be considered leading to an ethics of consensus on which method to be applied; (c)those who are stronger would have to act in the interest of weaker in order to sustain the principle of unity. In doing all these, the target would be to defeat the enemy together and not singularly. What this means is that even if one of the agents of unity has what it takes to defeat the enemy, he or she has to compromise this strength in order to ensure that victory is achieved as a group to defend and promote the ethics of unity. This kind of principle, I strongly believe, stands at the background to the ideology of Pan-Africanism and deserves to be questioned and if need be outrightly reconsidered and rejected in favour of an ideology that can empower the parts to act for and on behalf of the whole, provided that in and by doing so, the interests of all Africans are safeguarded. Here what is paramount is the need to safeguard the ethics of an African brotherhood and to ensure that an ideology of difference that defines this brotherhood does not cash in to ruin the brotherhood as a result of this. It is also to ensure that Africans can act differently in the interest of Africans but not necessarily through the form of unity that can weaken the whole.

To proceed in discussing the deficiencies of Pan-Africanism further, let me illustrate how Pan-Africanism is often invoked in African scholarship even when it does not amount to a specific intellectual principle. In scholarship, especially in the arts and the humanities, there are several academic conferences, programmes and projects that emphasise a Pan-African outlook. It is common to read such terms and concepts as 'Pan-African History' [Adi, H. & Marika 2003], 'The Pan-Africanist Worldview' [Agyman 1985], 'Pan-African Film Festival'[Nyamnjoh, F.B & Shoro, K., 2010:35-62] and 'Pan-African Poetry' (*ibid*). These gatherings or forums often amount to a gathering of Africanists who share their problems. Indeed, Ali Mazrui [2005] submits that in breadth, pan-Africanism covered a wider range - concerned not only with political economy, but also with African culture, aesthetics, poetry and philosophy.

But it can hardly be held that scholarship in these areas has produced significant 'Pan-African results' and a qualitative outcome on African life in terms of promoting the ideals of collective African wisdom and remarkable sense of dignity because of the often-ignored particularistic mode of the issues addressed and the fact that these issues often have different roots and

foundations which considerably vary from one part of Africa to another. Bangura [2012] seems to have pointed out - perhaps ironically - the dilemma of this scenario, when he canvassed for the application of what he calls 'Pan-African methodologies' in African scholarship, with the view that 'it would be sensible to break down the concept of Pan-Africanism by discipline; for instance, in the area of the natural science – geology, biology, medicine, pharmacology, etc.'. This position amounts to a vivid illustration of the disciplinary challenge of the implications of the idea of Pan-Africanism and shows that pan-Africanism is a suspicious ideology from the intellectual domain of thought for it is curious if not ridiculous, how the idea of Pan-Africanism could be applied to biology, medicine, pharmacology leading perhaps to 'united biology', 'united medicine', 'united pharmacology' or 'united African biology', 'united African medicine', and 'united African pharmacology', etc.

In an inaugural lecture held at the University of South Africa, Vusi Gumede [2014] argued that 'in the context of pan-Africanism and African renaissance, education or knowledge production broadly, should be based on an Afrocentric paradigm.' Paradoxically, the Afrocentric paradigm does not translate into Pan-Africanism, just as Pan-Africanism is not exactly the same thing as African renaissance. While Afrocentricism basically amounts to a form of consciousness, 'quality of thought, mode of analysis, and actionable perspective, where Africans seek, from agency, to assert subject placed within the context of African history' [Asante 2007] and African renaissance amounts to a deliberate re-awakening of this consciousness, Pan-Africanism seeks a form of unity of consciousness that has strong epistemological challenges that would obliterate (if not) negate some truths about Africans. This conceptual clarity is important to at least ensure that there is a reliable measure to validate actions implied by these. Indeed, each of these concepts and paradigms has challenges that are considerably different from one other.

But the obsession with the ideology of Pan-Africanism does not often urge this critical outlook. It is for this reason that it is often naively and wrongly, but enthusiastically, applied in scholarship without clarity, which is an accrual demand of scholarship. In applying the Pan-African idea this way, it does not, however, mean that the ideas or objects to which the pan-African reference is made are thereby made stronger or truer; it only means that they are thereby made more relevant, at least, within the mental universe of the African, who is fascinated by the idea and applies it for this reason. But whether and how exactly this is the case remains the question. As a matter of fact the creation of knowledge in Africa in favour of Pan-Africanism amounts to saying that the western encounter with Africa which came through the triple inhuman phases of slavery, imperialism and outright colonialism and which served as the inspiration for Pan-Africanism should be definitive of African consciousness forgetting that that there are aspects of African life such as African morality which harbour distinct values that cannot be defined by this encounter and which can be developed without strict reference to these phases of African history.

African philosophy has engaged the subject of reason and thought within the African scheme of thought for the last four decades. Interestingly, the effort has mainly been that of recognising and developing along different ethno-cultural potentials of the African world, such as: the Igbo philosophical worldview of Nigeria; the Akan philosophical worldview of Ghana; the Shona philosophical worldview of Zimbabwe; etc. This effort has sometimes led to a critical and

comparative engagement with these ideas and their implication when reviewed by the larger demand of African renewal, But the idea of a Pan-African philosophy as a union of philosophical ideas that are held to be pan-African has not been made a public discourse and outlook nearly half a century after of the study of the discipline. At best the form of unity that can be glimpsed from this discipline is philosophical reflections grounded in ethno-cultural thoughts and affiliations such as Akan philosophical discourse; Igbo philosophical discourse; Shona philosophical discourse, etc. which have given the discipline a measure of depth, significance and relevance. Although one can argue that the way these disciplinary formulations was achieved can be extended to the larger African world, leading thereby to what can be called a Pan-African philosophy, the challenge this poses is, does this imply a new constitution of Pan-African philosophy or a reaffirmation of an existing one. The implication of my claim here is that the human intellect basically seeks to locate issues and truths through their nature and through any form of distinction and the effort to distort this would amount to producing 'intellectuals against the intellect'[Oladipo 1999:18-24].If this is the case, then applying a Pan-African framework for knowledge production and consumption cannot be a viable option; and if pan-African lacks this intellectual foundation then it can be seen how weak it is to insist on Pan-Africanism as a preferred ideology for post-colonial Africa. In his inaugural lecture mentioned earlier Vusi Gumede [2014] made an effort to articulate what the author calls 'African thought leadership', which 'must be able to produce not only a critical but a conscious African citizenry that is grounded in pan-Africanist philosophies and driven to implement the African renaissance agenda'. Gumede (ibid) further submits that 'the curriculum, put differently, has to be shaped by the lived experiences of Africans'. However, he does not provide examples of these Pan-Africanist philosophies or say that any of them that are different from the ideology of Pan-Africanism. But ideology does not square up to philosophy in the purely technical sense of the term because of its totalitarian and anti-critical nature. Thus, the idea of a Pan-African philosophy is yet another assumption that has still to be established concretely.

Indeed, drawing from the positions so far held by this work, it can be seen that Pan-Africanism appears more or less as a design meant to over-simplify the complex nature of Africa; a refusal to deal with the 'cultural complexity'[Taukli-Worsome,2011] of Africa; and a reluctant diversionary formula that diverts the African mind from facing the concrete and practical demands of creating an African future. But the cultural complexity of the African is not overcome, but rather over-simplified by this measure; and this attempt at over-simplification does not promise a reliable solution to the problems implied. A more viable way to deal with a complex culture is to seek to untie the complexity by sifting the ideals that they represent; to see to what specific ends the African cultures are in a position to serve and harness them likewise. This, I think, is a more desirable demand of advancing the African world and it is in this direction that I propose Pro-Africanism as a more viable alternative to address the challenges of post-colonial Africa. I shall now articulate this proposal in the remaining part of this work.

The Idea of Pro-Africanism

By Pro-Africanism, I mean affording the other African as much mental and material resources as is possible to develop and advance the quality of African life, by allowing the African be the best that the African can be through what the African is or has. Pro-Africanism is supportive self-willed Africanism; an inward look that encourages promoting a developmental coalition of Africans along their endogenous, cultural and ethno-cultural roots for a reliable ethics of solidarity and development. I imply a form of supportive Africanism, with autonomy and self-will being the cardinal virtues of African modernity such that modern nation-states of Africa under a uniform umbrella will no longer be the basic determinant of the terms of alliance among African nationals but one where the cultural and intellectual potentials will serve as the defining basis for alignment and re-alignment. It could then be clear that the cultural, political and ethno-cultural nationalities of Africa can only develop to the extent that they evolve by aligning and re-aligning through their various endogenous worlds and they should embrace and promote their political institutions for this reason.

Pro-Africanism implies supporting or promoting the cause of African humanity through a strong disposition to a certain level of autonomy as may be necessary to allow the African to realise his or her personality and to allow each ethnic or cultural unit of Africa to explore the reservoir of their cultural resources through the support of any interested party in Africa. In doing this, the focus should be on promoting quality growth and advancement of fellow Africans. Pro-Africanism is, if you like, advancing the cause of greater Africa through the different ethno-cultural roots and finding enough need and value in this and reliving this by being African by choice and freedom; being African first by choice of values and needs of one's ethno-cultural affiliation, and not just by political affiliation, and seeking to reconnect the needs of the bigger Africa from this standpoint. By being African first, I mean encouraging and emphasising African ideals by allowing and promoting the freedom of the other African to evolve from his roots – culturally, morally and politically, first, and the need to seek a secure African future through this measure.

Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2005:162), provides positions that support the ideology of Pro-Africanism in what he characterises as 'people-to-people' Pan-Africanism or Pan-Africanism as a 'people-to-people relationship'. He suggests that applying the benefits of linguistic and cultural affinities of communities across several African states and building a cultural synergy among them through language development and advancement is the viable route to the realisation of the Pan-African idea. But the idea of Pro-Africanism means more than Ngugi's position indicates: Pro-Africanism is an inward-looking position or an African-in looking position that goes beyond linguistic affinity. It demands connecting to the larger Africa from and through these ethno-cultural roots and using this as point of contact to promote greater freedom for other Africans. Through this measure, it seeks to promote skills, talents, resources and gifts harboured anywhere in Africa, by seeking synergy along these lines which might go beyond linguistic or cultural affinity. By doing this, it desires to cause a self-willed affiliation and harmonisation of cultural and intellectual capitals for the flowering of African humanity.

The basic assumption of Pro-Africanism is that development and advancement in Africa demands an in-rooted option and that Africans can only advance through their natural

endowment promoted by their positive cultural advancements and achievements. Thus, it seeks the full expression of the autonomy of these capitals. For this reason, Pro-Africanism demands a fundamental disposition to allow the other African as much liberty as is possible individually or collectively to allow them to advance within the capacities of the world. It amounts to a positive and strong disposition as regards differences among African peoples by acknowledging these differences; and seeking where and how these differences compliment and supplement each other as a way of coordinating these differences; that is, allowing the other African 'to first be' as a way of basic ethics of promoting quality African growth and development. This option eliminates the cultural coercion that has been the lot of many African nationals and ethno-cultural communities stemming from a false idea of an African state, promoted by stronger cultural groups within the state and encouraged by western ethics of dominance and political and moral paternalism.

This project of the African first finds justification in the fact that there is the need to allow the African to first be what he/she/they have achieved through their natural and cultural endowment, by rational choice that accords dignity to the African and this is the basis to promote the quest for rational autonomy and authenticity. It is anchored in the fact that non-Africans, out of the exigencies of the constructions of modern history and operating as willing victims of the Western ideology through which Africa was subjugated, prefer that the African counted second. This is often achieved by emphasing what is not available in Africa rather than what is already available but absent in other climes. Thus, when Pro-Africanism recommends 'Africa/n first', the implication is that what is most desired is the promotion of the idea of the African person first and how, by recognising and promoting this, we could discover and build on the African potential to progress to a Pro-African world. It is a way of promoting the re-birth of the African will by affording every African, as individuals or as ethnic or cultural communities, adequate freedom to realise the potentials inherent in Africa's natural endowments. Thus, by allowing one to be and to be African enough, I am permitting him to be so for myself and for the greater gain and good of his people.

Just be the Zulu you are (or choose to be, the Igbo you are (or choose to be), the Ndebele you are (or choose to be), the Akan you are (or choose to be), the Bantu you are (or choose to be), *first*, before anything else and by and, in being so, permit me to be what I am. Then, both of us should, by being ourselves, seek cooperation within the context of any political formation we design for ourselves and apply our reservoirs of knowledge and culture to the best use of the African people and for the larger vision of Africa. What this means is that Africans know that they are made up of different cultures, have this understanding and intrinsically accept and see themselves as Africans. In this frame of thought, they accept that a certain microcosmic cultural principle may have permeated the continent but have taken different shapes, shades and forms. However, what now has different forms should inspire the vision of a big and greater Africa. Thus, each person, each cultural form should find enough value in this belief and act with this vision. This is Pro-Africanism. What this means is that I am allowing you to be yourself for the benefit of all of us. In this regard, it should be clear that the African is first African because he has certain Pro-African ideals that he/she/they (as a person or as an individual) has and shares for the benefit of the African people.

Another implication of Pro-Africanism is that it demands solidarity with and support for one's fellow Africans through support for the cultural personalities that the African represents and the cultural world from which the African is emerging. From here, supportive Africanism should ascend to the state that protects the African at the moment and gives as much encouragement and disposition as may be affordable and as can be realised for the growth of this state.

Pro-Africanism also addresses the needs of Africans whose parental origins are from different ethno-cultural or political nationalities – those who have been referred to as Afropolitans [Taukli-Worsome 2011]. Some of these Africans do not identify themselves strictly with or through one ethno-nationality of one African state or the non-African state but have chosen to insert themselves into an ethno-cultural nationality of an African nation-state or adopted one form of African citizenship or another, through which they intend to contribute to African humanity. This class of Africans, who are Africans of one location by choice, illustrate the ideals of Pro-Africanism from the political demand of the idea. Their idea or notion of Africa is not absolutely confined by their ethnic or cultural nationality but by their self-willed choice to be African in the best way that will favour them all. But this must also be complimented by doing this in the best way it can favour the larger Africans. For Africans who belong to one ethno-cultural group, and one state- the political demand of Pro-Africanism is that of defending the values that emanate from this group which are positive to the self-will and belief of members of the group, but which do not affect the demand for the same by members of the group; to act from this group to connect to the desires and the larger people of African descent.

Pro-Africanism habours some possible objections, one of which is that it may lead to 'ethnicization' of the African state, by seeking to support the state project in Africa along ethno-cultural lines only. This assumption is wrong. This is because the proposal admits that one may opt for and choose to belong to or affiliate with any ethno-cultural nationality, in so far as it can address one's needs of ethnic belonging. The central thesis that the idea of Pro-Africanism sets out to advance, therefore, is that the idea of Africa and African unity must be anchored on a primordial loyalty to the ethics, values and metaphysics of an ethno-cultural world of Africans or a freely chosen African world, as they are harboured by the cultural nationalities of Africa. Therefore, it advocates a primary loyalty to these, as from the basis on which to build the larger interest that would define and direct that African world, but not in a manner that affects other people's loyalty to theirs.

The argument on which it operates is that a political coalition, such as suggested or implied by Pan-Africanism, is not viable in Post-colonial Africa and cannot be productive because it does not significantly express and expand African freedom and does not suggest a loyalty to the principles and ethics of an African worldview that has been willingly signed. For this reason, it suggests that any outward gaze in search of the formula or the basis for constructing a bridge of interest that would direct Africa is wrong because it prefers an inside-out gaze, one which will enable an internal strengthening of mental structures that will define and direct the African people. It suggests that a basic loyalty to the core values of the various units of the African world is the basis for an African renaissance, which brings out the best in Africans everywhere.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have tried to canvass for an alternative ideology to Pan-Africanism, through what I call Pro-Africanism, which, in essence, suggests that what is relevant for Africans is supportive Africanism, by which African peoples can develop under different cultural frameworks that are appropriate to their history. To achieve this position, I have interrogated the basic ideals that the ideology of Pan-Africanism sets out to defend, by examining the relevance of these ideals. I have also been able to point out the limitations of the relevance of these ideals and the failure of Pan-Africanism to meet its desired objectives. It is my hope that the position that I have detailed here will provide the basis for a critical re-evaluation of the idea of Pan-Africanism, which has assumed the place of a long-held ideology in post-colonial Africa, notwithstanding its scarce gains and benefits in post-colonial times. For instance, it is hard to reconcile the number of wars that have been fought in black Africa with the longstanding commitment to Pan-Africanism as a basic ideology on the continent. What this points to is the need to source a fresh ideology, such as has been put forward by this essay. It is hoped that the ideas advanced here will produce a more pragmatic formula to explore better ways for the enhancement of productive unity among the African people.

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A Critical Reflection of African Philosophy and decolonization of the educational discourse in South Africa.

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Abstract

Higgs (2003, 01 - 03) argued that the philosophical discourse in South Africa concerning higher education, teaching and learning has always been fragmented. Twenty-five years later the philosophical discourse in education remains fragmented. During the apartheid years, philosophical discourse about the nature of higher education, teaching and learning was dominated by Fundamental Pedagogics, providing the foundational landscape for apartheid education in the form of Christian National Education. As such, "Fundamental Pedagogics" was regarded as a crucial element of apartheid education, evinced through Christian National Education. With the dismantling of apartheid and the abandoning of the system of Christian National Education it became necessary to formulate a new philosophical discourse in higher education. But what should constitute such a re-vision of philosophical discourse? In this paper, I argue for the introduction of an African discourse into the conversation surrounding the revision of philosophy of education in South Africa. In other words, the paper seeks to extend African philosophical ideas in the debate of decolonization of South African higher education. Thus, providing a contribution to contemporary practical issues to African philosophy and African experiences, specifically, South African. Such a discourse will refer to the African philosophy body of literature and the recent calls for decolonization in higher education as seen by social media hangtags, #FeesMustFall, #RhodesMustFall and media outlets.

Key words: African philosophy, educational discourse, decolonization, South Africa, apartheid and colonialism

Introduction

The years 2015 and 2016, saw "historically white" South African universities brought to disruption by mostly black students who were against the increase of student fees at their universities. South Africans saw students from disadvantaged to privileged universities stand together to fight against the increase of expensive fees, and other underlying challenges such as institutional racism, and the Eurocentric initial university curriculum. The fight against fee increment was labelled and hash tagged as the #FeesMustFall movement. The movement

started at the University of the Witwatersrand and rapidly spread to all government funded universities. Interestingly, government funded universities, also known as "historically black universities" students have conflicted with university management about the increase of student fees, accommodation and other basic student necessities without recognition by popular media outlets. Furthermore, before #FeesMustFall became a huge movement in late 2015, early in the year 2016, South Africa witnessed one of the most profound student movements after South Africa's democracy, labelled #RhodesMustFall. The #RhodesMustFall movement saw students express their unhappiness with the continued presence of Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town. The movement expressed a number of concerns black students had been battling with at the University of Cape Town, concerns such as the praise of Cecil John Rhodes, language of instruction, the colonial nature of the university and the lack of diversity and racial nature and culture the university had continued to embrace. The two movements aimed to fight against and address expensive tuition fees, institutional racism and the Eurocentric curriculum.

However, the government and universities' responses to the movements showed that the South African transformative policies were failing the post-apartheid generation of African descent and white universities had the power to not only dismiss these concerns but they had the infrastructure and racialised system which continued to dominate and hold black students hostage. According to a research study conducted by Chetty and Knaus (2016) the #FeesMustFall Movement was a manifestation of a class struggle in South African universities. The research showed that the higher education system was not only racially biased but was also class-based. Le Grange (2016) also conducted a study which showed that only 15 per cent of the 60 per cent of black students who survived first year eventually completed their studies. A reflection on these two studies to shows that, not only do the majority poor university students struggle to stay at the university they are registered at due to expensive tuition fees, racism, discrimination and the Eurocentric curriculum they were exposed to but they also had to struggle with the financial and social likelihood that they might not complete their studies. These studies showed the conditions which most disadvantaged poor "black" university students had been struggling to address. Furthermore, such studies show that while white universities register and admit more black students, these students were thrown into the deep end because they were in a world that was not designed for them, a world that excluded them and a world that wanted a percentage of black skins so that they had the scores to "show" their diversity without the actual diversity.

The paper argues that the #RhodesMustfall and #FeesMustFall movement secured and solidified a more in-depth focus on the current Eurocentric curriculum, colonial nature of South African universities and most importantly the insistence on the introduction of an Afrocentric education. The paper will argue that African philosophy can be applied as a possible strategy to redress, address and acknowledge African knowledge systems, and challenge the racially biased knowledge systems of the West. To support my argument, the paper draws on Higgs' (2003,10) who had envisioned that African philosophy can play a critical role in redressing and addressing centuries of domination, power, discrimination and Western school of thought. He argued that the liberation of Africa as a whole and its people from centuries of racially discriminatory colonial rule and domination has far-reaching implications for educational thought and practice. In other words, the liberal and transformation agenda should be intentional

in (South) Africa to address, redress and speak the language of the indigenous people. The #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall movement were intentional and clear about what students were not happy about and the changes they needed to improve their university experience. Students believed that the historically white universities, should be inclusive, diverse, acknowledge and accommodate different cultural backgrounds and expression. Such an embrace of diversity and inclusion is captured by Higgs (2003, 03) "The transformation of educational discourse in Africa requires a philosophical framework that respects diversity, acknowledges lived experience and challenges the hegemony of Western forms of universal knowledge and African philosophy acknowledges African knowledge systems and lived experience of the African people". Higgs' (2003, 10-11) argument of African philosophy as a framework that respects diversity, embraces togetherness and encourages the values of ubuntu, could also be applied as a methodology to push further the conversation of decolonization in higher education thus stripping away what is colonial about the higher education. This paper seeks to critically reflect on whether African philosophy, as a system of African knowledge(s), can provide a useful philosophical framework/methodology for the decolonization and re-construction of the higher education institutions. Thus, providing knowledge that would enable communities in (South) Africa to participate in their own educational development.

The history of Africa has been largely dominated by colonial power and Christian National Education. According to Wiredu (1980, 12) and Ramose (2002, 120) colonialism in Africa provided the framework for the organised subjugation of the cultural, scientific and economic life of many on the African continent. This subjugation impacted on African people's way of seeing and acting in the world. In fact, African identity, to all intents and purposes, became an inverted mirror of Western Eurocentric identity. This state of affairs gave birth to numerous attempts to reassert distinctively African ways of thinking and of relating to the world and was expressed in the call for an African Renaissance (Higgs, 2003: 06) and in the past two years, the calls for #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall movement. Of course, the calls for a more African centred approach to education, also known as African Renaissance, had been present for several years (see, Diop, 1996; Maloka, 2000; Muiu & Martin, 2002; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2002). However, one may argue that the momentum of the African centred approach to education had been accelerated by the #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall movements which forced the Department of Higher Education and Training to revisit the curriculum taught in higher education institutions. In his speech at the Higher Education Summit held in October 2015 the Minister of Higher Education and Training, Mr Blade Nzimande called for the Africanisation of universities. He stated, 'universities, all of them, must shed all the problematic features of their apartheid and colonial past'. At the summit the minister requested universities to investigate the issue of decolonising the curriculum. In the Western Cape province, for example, we have seen responses to the call for the decolonisation of the university curriculum: the appointment of a central curriculum committee to coordinate decolonising of the curriculum at the University of Cape Town, an all-day colloquium on the topic at the University of the Western Cape in May 2016.

The process of decolonisation that unfolded during the 1996 – 2002s saw Africa assert its right to define itself within its own African context in the attainment of independence. In other words, authors such as (Diop 1996, Maloka 2000 and Muiu & Martins 2002) began the process of

developing or re-constructing an African identity. WaThiong'o (1993) argued that Africans have the right to name the world for themselves and build a strong foundation for the current and future generation in African Philosophy, thus, participating in the educational discourse in South Africa. According to Makgoba, Shope & Mazwai (1999) "African Renaissance is a unique opportunity for Africans to define themselves and their agenda according to their realities and considering the realities of the world around them. It is about Africans being agents of their own history and masters of their destiny". Advocates of the African Renaissance in education such as Teffo (2000), Vilakazi (2002), and Seepe (2001), have shown that much of what is assumed to be education in Africa, is in fact European education and a mixture of what Europeans assume to be African. Higgs (2003, 07) also asserts that the African Renaissance has in the past couple of years taken on a much greater significance with the call for the recognition of indigenous African knowledge systems by such scholars as Hoppers (2000, 2002), Teffo (2000) and Seepe (2001, 2001a). Furthermore, the African Renaissance aimed to respond to an incorrect situation which according to Higgs (2003,07) assumed that Africans possess little or no indigenous knowledge of value that could be utilized in the process of educational transformation. The call for African Renaissance insists that all critical and transformative educators in Africa should embrace indigenous African world views and root their nation's educational paradigms in indigenous African socio-cultural and epistemological frameworks (Higgs 2003, 07 - 08). The African Renaissance argument implies that, the basic and higher education curriculum in (South) Africa should have African-ness as their focus, and as a result be indigenous-grounded and orientated. Failure to do so, particularly in South Africa, would mean that the agenda of transformation and diversity has not be achieved. And therefore, the education discourse continued to be alien, racially biased and irrelevant to an African child. To build on the purpose of this article I will discuss what is meant by African-ness because it is important to define and understand what we mean by African-ness, therefore leading an argument of contextualizing African philosophy in African and critically discussing how the project of educational decolonization shall be conducted.

What does African (-ness) mean

It is very important for issues that the paper discusses, understands and unpacks that the meaning of the adjective "African" in this paper be clearly defined. Understanding what African (-ness) means is crucial as it helps establish a uniquely African order of knowledge (see Masolo, 1995) and the basis of what is African. Dladla (2017, 103 - 109) argues that historically, "Africanism is understood as a philosophy of liberation". The argument of Africanism draws on the reflection of a moment in the development of the liberation struggle in South Africa, where certain younger members of the African National Congress tired of white paternalism and the reliance by the organisation on European ideas sought to redirect the struggle and its approach towards an African cultural basis which meant the reconnection of their contemporary struggle with the antecedent history of anti-colonial wars. The goal of the resistance struggle was to restore to the indigenous people their dignity and sovereignty. (Dladla, 2017: 104). While one of the most prominent African Philosophers - Ramose (2003, 114–116) argues that the term Africa(n) is contestable on at least two grounds. One is that the name is not conferred

by the indigenous people of Africa on themselves. Another is that the name Africa(n) does not by definition refer to the histories of the indigenous peoples inhabiting various parts of the continent from time immemorial. Higgs (2003, 06 - 07) understands Ramose's argument to mean that, the term (African) is geographically significant but, historically, its meaning is questionable from the point of view of the indigenous African peoples. Mudimbe (1988) and Hountondji (1985, 1996), on the other hand regard an intellectual product as African simply because it is produced or promoted by Africans. They, therefore, adopt a geographical criterion in their definition of the term 'African'. Mudimbe (1988) and Hountondji's (1985, 1996) view of the definition of Africa implies that they potentially regard as the contributions of Africans practising philosophy within the defined framework of the discipline and its historical traditions. Gyekye (1987, 72) understands African-ness to mean, something is 'African' if it directs its attention to issues concerning the theoretical or conceptual underpinnings of African culture. Gyekye (1987) writes: 'Philosophy is a cultural phenomenon in that philosophical thought is grounded in cultural experience'. Based on this view a study of the traditional African world in terms of views, ideas, and conceptions represents the unique substance of African philosophy and legitimates reference to what is referred to as African philosophy. In addition to Gyekye's definition of Africanism, Ramose, Serequeberhan and Okere, (as cited by Dladla, 2017) amongst others, argue that African philosophy in general, has its basis in "the culture and experience of African peoples" and the "African philosopher". In other words, the term African-ness (itself) at the very minimum should be arguing for the liberation of African Philosophy from the yoke of dominance and enslavement under the European (Western) epistemological paradigm (Dladla, 2017:107). The interest in this paper is with the nature of African-ness as a philosophy of liberation, decolonization and dismantling institutional racism and power, which has found expression in the indigenous people of Africa. In support of my argument, I adopt Dladla's argument that just like Western Philosophy describe the Wests' human nature and experiences, African philosophy should be doing the same in Africa. In other words, African philosophy should focus on providing Africans with the opportunity to discuss and describe their human nature, culture and experiences of African people. I also assert that African philosophy should provide Africans with an opportunity to reflect, redress and address the legacies of colonial power in (South) Africa, by refurnishing our minds, providing access to economic freedom to all and redefining our socio-economic realities. Below, I discuss African philosophy in an African context which aims at gaining an understanding of the African philosophy in Africa and how that speaks to the notion of decolonisation in Africa.

African Philosophy in an African Context?

> *"It would be a great day for African philosophy when the same becomes true of an African university, for it would mean that African insights have become fully integrated into the principal branches of philosophy"* (Wiredu 1998, 19).

The interesting quote above is from Wiredu's - Toward Decolonizing African Philosophy and Religion paper published in 1998. Kwesi Wiredu is a Ghanaian philosopher who has been involved in the project of "conceptual decolonization". Wiredu's view of Africa and African Philosophy is that for as long as African philosophy is taught and philosophised in English or

any other language that is not African it remains alien. For as long as African philosophy still follows the rules and application of Western philosophy, it is not African Philosophy. Wiredu pushes his argument to the extent that he argues that philosophers in Africa philosophy who philosophize using the western tradition style have not been de-westernised. Meaning the only true reflect or fashion of African philosophy in Africa, is if African philosophy is philosophized in an African manner. African philosophy will only be a true reflection of Africa when Africans philosophize as Africans and have de-westernized themselves from the Western traditions of philosophizing. Wiredu's view of how Africans should philosophize in African philosophy is aligned with Dladla's argument that just like Western Philosophy describe the Wests' human nature and experiences, African philosophy should be doing the same in Africa. It is such alignment and understanding that this paper seeks to achieve, that is, for the South African higher education to be decolonised and striped of its western traditions and have an authentic reconstruction of African. It needs to follow the rules and traditions of Africans, therefore embracing the nature and form of African logic, tradition and language. One must commend African philosophers who have been able to put their intellect to the service of the struggle and destiny of Africans (Higgs, 2003, 08) Their service has opened the door for the students at the University of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town to express the unhappiness and alienation that black students have endured at higher institutions which are meant to break down walls of discrimination and all forms of oppression including failure of the higher education to push forward the agenda of decolonization. The #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall only emphasised the calls put forward by African philosophers and African Renaissance scholars. The difficult conversation of understanding what African philosophy is has started and at this point those invested and dedicated to the work of Africa philosophy have to work towards using a realistic approach towards African philosophy in order to address African challenges. Thus, this section of the paper, discusses African Philosophy in an African context. Unfortunately, this will not be an easy task because I am an African and therefore, possess the insights to being African. Because of this I can share insights of what is to be an African in an African country, just like someone who is British can share their insights as genuine experiences of British people living in Britain. Whether, this is true or not, a question that could be asked is why the paper discusses African Philosophy in the African Context and not African Philosophy in general, whether in Africa or in Europe? The paper discusses African Philosophy in an African context because it is needed here in Africa. It is important here in Africa, because an African philosophy is expected to provide a service and philosophise not for its sake but for the development of an African identity which has been overshadowed by Western knowledge systems. African philosophy in African seeks to understand the origins of African(ism) or (ness) and their human nature. It speaks to philosophizing in African logic, language, traditions and experiences. African philosophy needs to be truly African, in Africa for it to be authentic to Africans first before it can be conceptualised by Europeans. Drawing from Wiredu (1998, 17) for as long as African Philosophy is still philosophised in the western forms and logics and traditions, it will not be able to address African challenges of decades of oppression, humiliation, discrimination and mental colonization, because it carries the energy and aroma of colonial power and discrimination. This means that if Africa philosophy does not decolonise itself first, strips itself of the colonial nature of the West then it will still be another form of African studies viewed through the lenses of Europe. African philosophy in Africa should

prioritize Africans, it should reflect on the years of mental oppression and colonialism which has taught Africans that they cannot think logically and with reason. African philosophy needs to take ownership of what is African to redress, restore Africans people's dignity and pride. Mostly, importantly, African philosophy needs to provide Africans with the tools to philosophize in their African state and sense and define themselves and their agenda according to their realities. African philosophy as a framework in the decolonization agenda should be self-love for Africans. We have seen the idea of addressing past injustices and pains of Africa's colonial past in scholars such as Serequeberhan (1994, 43) who adopts a hermeneutical perspective on African philosophy in Africa. The author argues that Africans reflecting and redressing the past in what is traditional to Africa, will help them to seek to escape an enslavement to the past by using that past to open the future. Such an activity could be done through comparative analyses. A comparative analysis Wiredu believes is important for African philosophers, as they will have to be aware of their western traditions of learning and interpreting that information in their own languages and African context. In this regard, Serequeberhan (1994, 43) as cited by Higgs (2003) states that: "the discourse of African philosophy is indirectly and historically linked to the demise of European hegemony (colonialism and neo-colonialism) and is aimed at fulfilling/completing this demise. It is a reflective and critical effort to rethink the indigenised African situation beyond the confines of Eurocentric concepts and categories" (Higgs 2003, 10). Through the reflection and comparative process, African philosophers therefore have the responsibility to not only de-westernized themselves, but they also must philosophise as Africans.

Higgs (2003, 11-12) asserts that to completely appreciate the distinctive features of African philosophy, it is also helpful to compare its method and execution with other systems of philosophy. Appiah (1994, 144) discusses the difference between African and Western philosophy being mindful of the attitude of the West towards Africa. Appiah (1994, 145) argues that the West considers the issue of what philosophy is 'for'—that is, its social meaning and relevance— with intellectual and academic contempt. Undoubtedly, the West does philosophize in a different style and method from Africa, although this may be attributed to enormous resources and funding (Appiah,1994) & (Higgs, 2003). In other words, because of the years of perfecting philosophy, the West philosophizes differently or rather the West philosophizes from superiority and is concerned with perfecting philosophical discourse for its own sake, while Africa wants to use philosophy to address social challenges and remove what is colonial in the higher education space, as expressed by black students at the University of Cape Town thereby providing a student or scholar with an authentic African experience of being in the world.

The paper accepts that African philosophy should in one form, or another render a 'service' as it potentially can if done correctly and that if it draws it strengths, logic, language and tradition from Africans. If it decolonises and strips away what is western in African philosophy and philosophises to address social stigmas, violence and inherited pain and loss of identity. Wiredu (as quoted by Anyanwu, 1989, 127) concludes: '... we will only solve our problems if we see them as human problems arising out of a special situation'. Thus, Anyanwu (1989, 127) affirms that African philosophy 'invites people to take a stand on the issue of reality as experienced'. The paper concurred that our human problems are a special situation and our reality and

experiences mean something. Our experiences as Africans should not be denied as legitimate experiences just because they are from Africa. It is also these experiences that help re-build indigenous knowledge systems and show how these knowledge systems could be of expression in contemporary Africa. Higgs (2003, 13) asserts that these experiences of an African reality give rise to a sense of commonality which finds expression in the discourse of community in Africa, and the African ethic of ubuntu.

This paper accepts most of the African scholars' conceptualization of African philosophy and what is expected to come out from it. However, we need to be mindful of the fact that decolonizing the South African educational discourse might prove to be extremely difficult because our South African "transformative ideologies & goals" have not been able to carry us through the reflection, redress and address process, which contextualise and address the experiences of the poor, marginalised and uneducated. One of the contextual questions to be addressed in (South) Africa is how we can achieve and implement a decolonised educational discourse, which will be reflected by educational institutions such as universities, as the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movement envisioned. I pose this question because some universities are government funded and to some extent report to the Department of Higher Education and Training and are expected to fulfil promises made by the liberation movement to build and open the doors of learning to all. This expectation was based on the understanding that the government made education (basic and higher education) a priority and should have allocated adequate resources to make education a public good rather than a commodity accessible to those who are financially privileged. The paper believes that African philosophy shall not be limited to reflecting, redressing and addressing socio-economic challenges only but African philosophy should also critically address and philosophise our uncolonized government, which our educational discourse is aimed at functioning in or rather provide alternative methodologies of decolonizing the educational discourse within a colonised state. I shall now turn my attention to the notion of decolonization and the South African educational discourse.

Decolonization and the South African Educational Discourse

I shall now turn my attention to what the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movement aimed to redress and address about the colonial nature of historically white universities and years of studying Western norms and the way of life in an African university. There were several concerns which the students called to be addressed, but the most eminent challenges, were tertiary fee increases and a decolonised Afrocentric education. For the purposes of this discussion, it is important that I describe what the paper means by decolonization. Wiredu's view of decolonization is a form of epistemological practice. Meaning decolonization is a practice of removing colonial nature and stripping away colonial knowledge in the African educational discourse. It is a form of washing away what is not needed or something that does not serve others. Fataar (2018, 02) defines decolonization as a philosophy which "eschews static knowledge orientations". He argues that it is founded on a type of complex knowledge dynamism in fidelity to disciplinary and transdisciplinary foundations, and always alert to a type of problem-posing dynamism, writes Fataar (2018,02). While Sesanti (2019) was adamant

in his argument that for decolonization to truly mean something, African universities must use ancient Egyptian ethics and history as a cornerstone of an Afrocentric decolonial curriculum knowledge approach. Heleta (2018, 48) states that 'decolonization of knowledge implies the end of reliance on imposed knowledge, theories and interpretations, and theorizing based on one's own past and present experiences and interpretation of the world'. There is consensus amongst scholars that decolonization is a form of epistemic practice which aims to strip away what is colonial in the African discourse; thus working towards an Africanised framework of African philosophy which renders a service to address contemporary social challenges and develop in Africa. For the purpose of section, I will employ Wiredu's view of decolonization in relation to South Africa's educational discourse.

During the #RhodesMustFall movement, a student from UCT by the name of Athabile Nonxuba was interviewed by the News24 team to explain what students meant by decolonised education and why it was important for them. Nonxuba noted that the current curriculum was Eurocentric and dehumanised black students, he was quoted as saying "we study all these dead white men who presided over our oppression, and we are made to use their thinking as a standard and as a point of departure for our own thinking as Africans has been undermined". He argued that we must have our own education from our own continent because decolonization can only happen if we take it upon ourselves to start the process. According to Nonxuba (2016) decolonization means advancing the interests of Africans, instead of advancing Eurocentric interests. Nonxuba (2016) as cited by News24 asserts that eurocentrism does not serve our interests culturally, socially and economically. It is not neutral; it only serves particular interests. For instance, the works of Karl Marx, which is considered worthy is offered repeatedly as a standard, instead of introducing new or even old ideas by Africans. White lecturers teach students African music and the base of music studies is classical European music. The curriculum does not accommodate creativity and expression in African languages. For example, drama students feel they are marked lower if they produce work in African language. Nonxula as cited by News 24 (2016) also makes an interesting distinction by arguing that decolonization of education is not the same as transformed education. While one may argue that these views may be from one student, it is worth noting that most students could relate to Nonxuba's views hence, the #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall movement. The paper purposefully chooses to include Nonxula's interview who is a student political leader because he did not only speak about what and how students feel about the nature of colonial power and oppression which they experience in "white" universities, he also spoke of the distinction between decolonizing education and transforming education, which is a profound distinction which has been overlooked. The distinction also showed that students understand the difference between the failed political transformation education we were promised by the African National Congress (ANC) after they were afforded political power and the new economic struggle the current generation finds themselves in and therefore question the education which has not "transformed" or offered them access to opportunities to which their white counterparts have access. .

Furthermore, it is worth noting that there seems to be consensus in South Africa, with regards to the need to decolonise the South African education as part of a broader plan, to strengthen our educational system and, indirectly, our society and economy. Ramogale & Le Grange (2016) share the views that the need to decolonise our education comes out of a recognition that

much of what is taught is a legacy from our colonial past, a past which was designed to entrench unequal power relations and privileges for a minority (Ramogale 2016). African knowledge and philosophising based on African logic, language and traditions is at the heart of this paper. This paper is of the view that what is required in Africa is a conceptual approach and languages of description that move the decolonising education debate towards consideration about the terms on which knowledge selection for a decolonial curricular approach ought to proceed. An approach that does not side-line and favour a certain aspect of ideology. The objective is to seek an approach/ methodology which brings forward an authentic African sense of African philosophy.

As I write this article and reflect on the RhodesMustFall and FeesMustFall movement, I am reminded of the former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki who argued in a well-known speech, that South Africa still comprises two nations. The former President observed that South Africa is divided into two "nations", the one nation is black and the other is white. According to Lesteka (2011,52) Mbeki (1998) made a case for South Africa as 'Two Nations', drawing on Sir Benjamin Disraeli's (1980) novel Sybil, or Two Nations. He described one of these nations as white, relatively prosperous, with ready access to a developed economy, physical, educational, communication, and other infrastructures. The other he described as black and poor, with the worst affected being women in rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled, who live under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructures. As a result, while blacks can exercise the right to equality of opportunity, they live in underdeveloped conditions and with little possibility of exercising their right to equality of opportunity.

For making such a critical and necessary observation the former president was vilified. Nattrass and Seekings (2001) took issue with him for reducing inequality to race, that is, black equals poor and white equals rich. Nattrass and Seekings argued that by emphasizing interracial economic inequality Mbeki misunderstood the changing nature of inequality in South Africa. They posited that inequality in post-apartheid South Africa was driven by two-income gaps between an increasingly multiracial upper class and everyone else, and between a middle class of mostly urban, industrial, or white-collar workers and a marginalized class of black. In Letseka's view (2011,53) Nattrass and Seekings glossed over South Africa's racially skewed labour market in which whites continue to hold most skilled occupations and senior management positions while Africans continue to swell the ranks of juniors and support staff. Moleke (as cited by Lesteka 2011) argues that because of discrimination and acquired human capital ''South Africa's labour market is characterized by racial job segregation both between sectors and between occupational categories. Moleke contends that ''Whites are still overrepresented in skilled occupations and their representation at senior management level is also relatively high''. The point being made here is , twenty one years later, Mr Thabo Mbeki's observation of two nations is still correct and evident not only in rural areas where the majority of people living there are uneducated but in higher learning institutions, financially disadvantaged youth of South Africa still feel excluded and marginalised. However, the promise of studying and obtaining a degree makes them believe that access to opportunities is through education. In this way they hope that they can help fight economic inequalities; occupy skilled and senior management positions, where they will have power and voice to influence

change. But for most of us, reality is different, hence, the need for the youth of South Africa to re-group and begin a different struggle, a struggle of economic freedom and decolonization of education, power and authentic Africanism. The concerns raised by Nonxuba with the News24 team are legitimate and worthy of attention by educational institutions, government and the academic community at large. The concerns raised by the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movement were based on lived racial bias, instilled institutional exclusion of black African students, Eurocentrism curriculum which does not speak to black African people's experiences and disregard or failure to acknowledge African phenomena. This is the kind of redress and decolonization in a true authentic African sense that Wiredu (1998, 17 - 18) insists is required in African universities and African philosophy.

One of the commonalities which Africans continue to share is the understanding of unity in an authentic African experience. In the words of Diop (1962, 07), '... there is a profound cultural unity still alive beneath the deceptive appearance of cultural heterogeneity present in Africa which gives rise to certain commonalities in indigenous African knowledge systems.' One of the commonalities Africans shares is the ideology of unity and community. According to Letseka (2000, 181) the importance of communality to traditional African life cannot be overemphasized. In other words, community in an African setting is what binds and provides a sense of belonging and shared goals within a people. The notion of a true authentic African philosophy, which has been decolonised from the western norms and traditions, could be a vehicle to push decolonization in educational discourse by redressing the current Eurocentric curriculum, by accommodating the traditional African life, inform and promote a collective effort directed at the good of the community. This collective effort in turn would be characterised by a spirit of ubuntu which is expressed by the combination of shared identities and solidarity; it is characterised by a relationship in which people identify with each other and exhibit solidarity with one another. To identify with each other is largely for people to think of themselves as members of the same group; to conceive of themselves as a "we", as well as for them to engage in joint projects, coordinating their behaviour to realize shared ends Metz (2009, 352). For educational interests, this would mean that African educational thought and practice would be directed at fostering African logic, language and traditions; endowed with moral norms and virtues such as kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, courtesy and respect and concern for others. In support of Nonxula (2016) and Wiredu (1998) views on African-ness (South) Africans need to advance their own economic, social and educational interests by applying a pragmatic African or community centred approach where young people value diversity, unity, communalism, interconnectedness and acquire necessary skills for the (South) African job market (Lesteka ,2000). Such an approach according to Lesteka (2000) would mean that young people are part of communities, education discourse and job markets which fully embrace and value African-ness, understood as ubuntu. It is assumed that persons who aim to improve and strive towards better social, economic and educational discourse treat others with a sense of ubuntu, which entails treating them with fairness, shared goals and solidarity. This means, people who exhibit traits of ubuntu and African-ness share a relationship in which people identify with each other and exhibit solidarity with one another. The emphasis on communalism and ubuntu in African thought and experience also requires education in the African context to pay attention to interpersonal and co-operative skills (Higgs 2003,15).

Furthermore, according to Higgs (2003, 15), for Africans, what they know is inseparable from how they know it in the lived experience of their African culture. This sense of African-ness is, has built a deep socio-ethical sense of cultural unity that provides the African identity with its distinctiveness from the West. I believe that the aim for a decolonized educational discourse at the end of the tunnel is to build what the former first black president, Dr Nelson Mandela aimed to see in South Africa, which was a diverse country, coined the rainbow nation. The #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movement called for more inclusion in the curriculum and expression of creativity in African languages. In other words, the South African transformation agenda should not only ensure that inclusive decolonization takes place but also serve as a reminder for both blacks and whites to always aim towards a more integrated African identity and the values of ubuntu.

The purpose of the decolonised educational discourse in South Africa should be fundamentally concerned with ubuntu in the service of the community and personal wellbeing. In this regard Letseka (2000,188) also argues that interpersonal skills have been shown to be an integral part of educating for ubuntu and the promotion of communally accepted and desirable moral norms and virtues. The development of skills such as cooperative skills will, therefore, play a crucial role in promoting and sustaining the sort of communal interdependence and concern with the welfare of others that is encouraged by ubuntu. This sort of communal interdependence emphasises the fundamental principles of governing in the traditional African life (Higgs, 2003 & Lesteka, 2000). Thus, the paper endorses Okeke's (1982, 56) idea where he argues that traditional education in the African context, sought to instil desirable attitudes, dispositions, skills and habits in children by means of recounting the oral traditions of the community. In this sense, African educational thought and practice is characterized not only by its concern with the person, but also by its interweaving of social, economic, political, cultural, and educational threads together into a common tapestry. And as a result, education in an Africa context will be distinguished by the importance attached to its collective and social nature, as well as its intimate tie with social and communal life. It will also apply to an authentic African education, which philosophises in African logic, language and traditions. Maintaining a sense that an African setting cannot, and indeed, should not, be separated from African life and experience. It is a natural process by which a person gradually acquires skill, knowledge, and attitudes appropriate to life in his or her community—an education inspired by a spirit of ubuntu in the service of the community (Higgs, 2003). Thus, the project of decolonisation in the educational discourse should speak to shared identities, goals and solidarity; engage in joint projects for the good of the people. For people to fail to identify with each other could involve outright division between them, people not only thinking of themselves as an "I" in opposition to a "you" or a 'they", but also aiming to undermine one another's ends. As we have seen this is the outright division between #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall students, university management and the government. The ultimate aim for the improvement of African philosophy in the educational discourse is to improve and integrate Western and African knowledge systems. Inspire to build better and informed virtues of togetherness, interconnectedness and acting for the sake of others.

Conclusion

In closing, the paper reflected on whether African philosophy, as a system of African knowledge(s), can provide a useful philosophical framework for the decolonization and re-construction of the higher education institutions. The focus of this paper included a discussion on the nature of African-ness as a philosophy of liberation, decolonization and dismantling institutional racism and power. I argued that an authentic African-ness should provide Africans with an opportunity to reflect, redress and address the legacies of colonial power in (South) Africa, by refurnishing our minds, providing access to economic freedom to all and redefining our socio-economic realities. Therefore, the pragmatic African-centred approach of African philosophy should not be limited to reflecting, redressing and addressing socio-economic challenges only but should also critically address the uncolonized state of government, which our educational discourse is aimed at functioning in and provide alternative methodologies of decolonizing the educational discourse within a colonised state. The project of decolonisation in the educational discourse should speak to African life experiences, improve and integrate Western and African knowledge systems. Inspire to build better and informed virtues of togetherness, interconnectedness and act for the sake of others.

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Ruminations on the Debilitating Triad: Neo-Colonialism, Predatory Capitalism and Militarism

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Abstract

This paper outlines a philosophical Pareto[50] analysis of the socio-political and economic challenges that continue to stagnate large swathes of the African continent. If one can visualize these challenges as branches of a massive tree, then this paper maintains that neo-colonialism, predatory capitalism and militarism are the roots of this tree. By performing this causal analysis, the author hopes to lay the groundwork for an emancipatory discourse that does not chase after phantoms.

Introduction

In the year 1919, Edward Morel, deeply disappointed with the wanton exploitation of the Congo by the Belgian colonial government, observed that**:**

> *"The African is really helpless against the material gods of the white man, as embodied in the [triad] of imperialism, capitalistic-exploitation, and militarism. If the white man retains these gods (and if he insists upon making the African worship them as assiduously as he has done himself) the African will go the way of the red Indian, the Amerindian, the Carib, the Guanche, the aboriginal Australian, and many more."[51]*

In the year 2020, over 100 years after Morel's writing, similar problems continue to bog down many African countries. Imperialism has been replaced by neo-colonialism, capitalistic exploitation has morphed into more predatory forms, and militarism now includes subtle forms of biological warfare. I shall refer to these three challenges as the *debilitaing triad*. The devastating toll of this triad upon large sections of the African population cannot be lightly overlooked. I contend that a large part of the reasons why many African countries are "falling behind and falling apart"[52] can and should be traced back to the three-pronged machinations of the debilitating triad.

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[50]The Pareto Principle states that 80% of consequences come from 20% of the causes. The principle, which was derived from the imbalance of land ownership in Italy, is commonly used to illustrate the notion that things are not equal, and the minority owns the majority.

[51]E. D. Morel, *The Black Man's Burden* (London: The National Labour Press, 1919), 9.

[52]Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3.

My objective in this paper is to articulate the *modus operandi* of the debilitating triad, and to formulate general frameworks for addressing their catastrophic effects. My overall project here is emancipatory in outlook, hoping to lay the groundwork for a more progressive and humane future. In this discourse, I make many allusions to often neglected knowledge coming from traditional African cultures and religions.[53] The idea here is not to romanticize such knowledge but to engage them in dialogue with mainstream Western thinking. My arguments involve a certain distancing from the grand narratives of mainstream social, political and economic thought, pointing to long term unsustainability of Morel's triad. I will lean heavily upon the hermeneutics of suspicion, often concurring that "everyone who has ever built anywhere a 'new heaven' first found the power thereto in his own hell."[54]

The paper is structured as follows: first, I present neo-colonialism, the first member of the debilitating triad. I intend to showcase neo-colonialism as ultimately the master of the other two members of the triad. Second, I engage with thorny aspects of capitalistic economics which tend to cause economic thought and praxis to emanate from a platform of systematized greed. Third I engage with the last member of the debilitating triad: militarism in its many forms. Within each section, I will articulate high-level responses by way of looking inwards to African cultures and religions for dialectical sources of practicable and sustainable solutions.

The Pattern of Neo-Colonialism

Neo-colonialism can be defined as the geopolitical practice of using capitalism, business globalization, and cultural imperialism to influence a country, in lieu of either direct military control[55] or indirect political control.[56] Despite the possible good intentions of neo-colonialists, long experience has revealed that sustained neo-colonial practice leads to tight corners and paradoxes. Some scholars hold the suspicious view that modern political systems strive to keep African countries perpetually embroiled in internal inter-ethnic strife, creating nation states that remain "aloof from indigenous or native society and enforce[s] its will through violence and repression, placing emphasis on the rudiments of law and order that [are] sufficient to ensure economic exploitation."[57] The irony behind it all comes to light when those that vehemently accused ATR[58] of engaging in human sacrifice turned around and sacrificed millions of Africans in order to appease the neo-colonial idols[59] that adorned the shrines of economic interest. Upon deeper examination on the basis of Critical Theory, this comes as no surprise since "the idea of the national community [...], first set up as an idol, can eventually be maintained only by terror."[60] Given the realpolitik of our times, I do not imagine that these situations will magically disappear. Indeed, entire armies, treaties and armaments have long

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[53]I recognize that there may be close to three thousand flavors of African Traditional Religion (ATR) that are usually ignored in typical inter-religious dialogue.

[54]Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*, trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co, 1998), 82.

[55]Imperialism.

[56]Hegemony.

[57]Eghosa E. Osaghae, "Fragile States," *Development in Practice* 17, no. 4–5 (August 2007): 695, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520701470060.

[58]African Traditional Religion.

[59]For example, preserving the "integrity" of nation states by eliminating people who hold dissenting opinions.

[60]Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (London: Continuum, 1947), 14.

been deployed to maintain the neo-colonial status-quo. Attempts to reverse some of these political structures remain at the root of many contemporary violent (and undesirable) conflicts. Well did Jean-MarcEla note that "in order to emerge from situations of misery and injustice in which the vast majority of Africans live after [many] years of independence, and which offend man's dignity, great is the temptation to repel such insults to human dignity with violence."[61]

Consequently, to address neo-colonialism, I propose an indirect route: focused on reducing the devastating effects of its two handmaids: predatory capitalism and militarism. Those who intend to struggle against extremely sophisticated external manipulations would do better if not bogged down in various forms of scorched earth warfare. The key here is to be able to thrive in spite of neo-colonial machinations, like a snail that gently climbs the thorny stem of a wildflower.

The Pattern of of Predatory Capitalism

Predatory capitalism refers to uncritical acceptance of domination and exploitation as normal economic practice. On the national and international levels, instances include unchallenged political corruption, the sabotaging of trade unions, the suppression of wages, the perpetuation of economic slavery, and wealth creation by means of imposing debt on vulnerable populations. The dire consequences of predatory capitalism are well presented in the documentary movie titled "The Wages of Debt"[62]:

> In the [1980s], trapped by the amount of debt, third world governments were forced to reimburse their loans with interest rates five to six times higher than those practised on financial markets. These countries then had forced upon them structural adjustment plans by the IMF, which led to the privatization of public services and the massive export of resources, with disastrous consequences for their development. In their wake, came corruption and subtle networking which left a long-lasting legacy.[63]

In light of these occurrences, the curious classification of countries into First World, Second World and Third World (with the Third World perennially taking loans in their attempts to upgrade their status and become just like the First World) countries become problematic upon further inspection. For instance, close analysis has revealed that "for every person in the world to reach the present [United States] levels of consumption with existing technology would require [resources from] four more planet Earths."[64] The emanating tragedy remains that those Third World countries that have worked hard to become First World countries have "joined the industrial world in erasing the last of the natural environments."[65] The depletion of the natural environment is once more identifiable with the disdain of [Nature's] ordinary providence. The proliferation of highfalutin ecological and theological discourse, without meaningful actions, will have little effect on improving the earth's environment. It is not surprising that the earth

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[61]Jean-Marc Ela and Robert R Barr, *African Cry* (Eugene, Or.:Wipf& Stock, 2005), 55.

[62]https://www.rt.com/shows/documentary/africa-wages-of-debt-799/

[63]Jean-Pierre Carlon, *Press Kit: The Wages of Debt* (La Ciotat: ARTE France, 2010).

[64]Edward O. Wilson, *The Future of Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 23.

[65]Wilson, 22.

begins to resemble an "immense pile of filth."[66] Attempts to implement the fuzzy concept of *economic growth* have caused human existence to adopt the dynamics of cancer cells. Some poor African countries have now jumped from the frying pan of debt slavery into the fire of environmental degradation. Small wonder Moyo classified the international debt enterprise as "Dead Aid."[67]

Awkward metaphysical[68] structures continue to animate economic misery in contemporary times. For instance, the over-emphasis on economic production remains blind to the question of demand-and-supply: Who will consume all that is produced? Will the market be free and fair? Why do we need *beggar-thy-neighbor*[69,70] tactics to ensure the real or simulated demand and supply? The myriad hermeneutical prejudices[71] of many *economic experts* have effectively become blinders imposed upon millions of people. Economic experts have hijacked the hermeneutical spiral, and theoretical economic models have replaced the received wisdoms that sustained millions of people in Africa from times immemorial.

Economic prophets have surreptitiously replaced the false religious prophets of biblical times. The tyranny of such prophets continues to dominate and dictate the lives of many. Modern economics, if it is not to lead the African economies to the edge of doom, stands in dire need of a hermeneutic of suspicion. Keen went as far as denouncing modern economics as "the naked emperor of the social sciences."[72] The myriad formulations of neo-classical economics are transcendental entities imposed upon human communities. The transcendental flaws in their formulation aid the construction and perpetuation of poverty. Africa is loaded with resources,[73] yet millions go hungry. Those who seek to help the hungry continue to resort to the transcendental economic constructs, and the cycle of misery is re-energized.

On an optimistic note, the myriad weaknesses latent in contemporary economic ratiocinations are the very things that can be exploited in the crafting of more viable economic solutions. All that is needed is a fundamental openness to dialectical discourse.

A Response: Hybridized Economics

Upon close examination, it can be shown that contemporary understanding of terms like '*wealth*' and '*poverty*' tend to be constructed upon shaky foundations, economic and otherwise. These concepts are quickly rendered empty of their presumed meanings upon serious critique. The uncritical reduction of the idea of wealth to narrow manifestations of paper money remains problematic. Questions abound: where does paper money get its value from? Why does vaguely

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[66]Pope Francis, *Laudato Si* (Rome: Vatican Press, 2015), para. 21.

[67]Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*, 1st American ed (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).

[68] Metaphysical here is meant in the broader philosophical sense, not limited to '*spiritual beings*.

[69]In economics, a *beggar-thy-neighbour* policy is an economic policy through which one country attempts to remedy its economic problems by means that tend to worsen the economic problems of other countries.

[70] See Adam Smith: *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,* Book IV, Chapter III (part II): "nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours"

[71]Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd Ed. (London: Continuum, 1989), 281.

[72]Steve Keen, *Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences* (Annandale: Pluto Press, 2002), 2.

[73] See Resource Map of Africa in Appendix-1.

defined paper money continue to dominate the economic discourse? Do we need to elaborate more on the hermeneutics of paper money? The fastest way out of '*poverty*' is to undertake a radical re-definition of '*wealth*'.

The surest way to sustainable '*wealth*' is to remember that "nature can provide for the needs of mankind, but it cannot provide for the greed of mankind."[74] In light of the preceding, it can be argued that the Enlightenment thought process[75] which sought to cleanse the world of myths and enthrone reason ultimately liquidated reason and multiplied pseudo-scientific myths. The greed of mankind has been synthesized in the most awkward thought processes that seek to impose ideas upon nature, rather than bow down and learn from nature. Africa has been reduced to a source of raw materials and a huge market of consuming non-producers.

I propose the adoption of a two-layered economic system within each African country that has been affected by poorly articulated economic ratiocinations. This hybrid economy will consist of two layers. First, an outward-facing economy that interfaces with the international (money-dependent) community. Secondly an inward-facing economy, directed toward optimizing the life of each ethnic group within the country. The idea here is to optimize those aspects of tribal life that ensure the continued availability of food, shelter and clothing; all without the excessive dependence upon money. Anta Diop spoke about two aspects of African traditions: one that has "remained intact and continues to survive"[76] and another one "that has been altered by contamination from Europe." The response I propose here must develop deep-rooted cultural competencies with regard to these two aspects and put them in dialogue with other traditions of the world.

This exercise will entail checkmating the routine demonization of ancient cultures; cultures that are usually poorly understood or badly misinterpreted (and many of these cultures subsisted for centuries with minimal need for money[77]). I concur with Sen as he argues that "poverty must be seen as the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely as lowness of [monetary] incomes, which is the standard criterion of identification of poverty."[78] I outline some key elements of this exercise in the following paragraphs.

Striving to make good education cheap and functional on several levels. I have already worked up a blueprint for linking schools to viable industries.[79] Schools will need a modified philosophy of education, one that is amenable to a hybridized economic system. Great cultural competencies will need to be fleshed out in these projects.

Optimization of local food production. Rural farmers should be encouraged and incentivized to produce whatever food they can in commercially viable quantities. Many of these rural communities provided for themselves in times past. The culture of encouraging them to depend solely upon imported food items should be heavily discouraged. It will be a good idea to return

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[74] Gandhi is supposed to have said this in Hindi in 1947 to his secretary, Pyarelal Nayyar, who reproduced it in his book, *Mahatma Gandhi*: The Last Phase, 2 vols. (Ahmedabad, 1956–1958), 2: 552.

[75] These Enlightenment thought processes ultimately produced neo-classical economic theories.

[76] Cheikh Anta Diop and Egbuna P Modum, *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in African Culture & Development, 1946-1960* (London: Karnak House, 1996), 33.

[77] Several African tribes used cowries and manilas for currency.

[78] AmartyaSen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1999), 87.

[79] Henry Ibekwe, "A Pragmatist, Progressivist Blueprint for the Twinning of Tertiary Education and Industry in Nigeria" (Course Work (Philosophy of Education), Arrupe College, Harare, Zimbabwe, 2013).

to the local traditions, to optimize their processes, and to ensure the availability of healthy food items.

Renewable energy like wind and solar power should be preferred for mechanized work. There has been enough damage done by the careless drilling for crude oil in places like Nigeria. Many African countries receive large quantities of sunlight each year. There is no obstacle to taking advantage of this freely available natural resource.

The Many Faces of Militarism

Given the rise of nation states in modern Africa, there will always be justification for the institution of armies meant to defend the territorial integrity of these states. In this sense, militarism has its uses. On the other hand, the many civil wars that have plagued African nation states continue to boggle the imagination. Appendix 1 depicts a resource map of Africa. It is of particular interest to note that the regions with the highest deposits of natural resources are frequently war zones and trouble spots. Harbom and Wellensteen tabulated the statistics of armed conflicts by region between the years 1989 and 2009, their results are tabulated in Table 1.

Table II. Armed conflicts by region, 1989–2009[a]

Region	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	1989–2009
Europe	2	3	7	8	9	5	5	1	0	2	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	23
Middle East	4	7	8	7	7	6	6	7	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	5	5	4	4	5	13
Asia	16	21	15	20	15	16	16	18	19	16	15	17	14	12	16	14	16	15	14	15	15	39
Africa	12	13	16	14	10	16	11	11	15	16	16	15	15	15	9	10	7	10	12	13	12	41
Americas	9	6	5	4	3	4	4	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	3	2	2	3	3	3	15
All conflicts	43	50	51	53	44	47	42	40	40	39	39	37	36	32	29	32	32	33	35	37	36	131

[a] For data back to 1946, see www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm or www.prio.no/cscw/ArmedConflict.

Table 1: Armed conflicts by region 1989 - 2009[80]

The table reveals that there were 131 global armed conflicts that raged between the years 1989 and 2009. Focusing now upon Africa, the rightmost column of Table 1 immediately reveals that Africa (the supposedly poorest continent) had to contend with 41 armed conflicts between the years 1989 and 2009. Once more, the existence of 41 conflicts in a continent comprised of 54 countries, over a period of 20 years, remains something to keep pondering about. Based upon an examination of the rightmost column, one can boldly draw a statistical correlation between economic poverty and armed conflict: those places deemed economically poor tend to mysteriously devolve into armed conflict. The paradox here is striking. Feinstein has described the shadow global arms trade as "a sprawling web of networks,"[81] making the case that:

> *Unsurprisingly, Africa has been among the shadow world's most fertile ground. The continent's colonial history, independence struggles, Cold War battles, weak state formations and 'big men' rulers willing to plunder their nations to retain power and enrich themselves have ensured continuous conflict, violence and poverty.[82]*

The shadow arms trade animated the atrocities committed in the prosecution of Africa's most notorious conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo,

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[80]Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 4 (July 2010): 502.

[81]Andrew Feinstein, *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade* (New York: Picador, 2012), 435.

[82]Ibid.

Angola, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, Libya and Ivory Coast. The scale of these conflicts has rendered Africa fertile ground for transactions involving shadow arms dealers.

I remember contemplating the photographs of ragged-looking African child soldiers, wielding sophisticated weapons whose financial value could pay their school fees and feed them for several weeks. Many more of such photographs abound of war-torn countries with "*financially challenged*" fighters armed with expensive military gear; all this despite the fact that Third World countries are often essentialized, in the media and elsewhere, using the adjective *poor*. There remains, however, the puzzle of how these essentially poor peoples are able to sustain long-running wars with the use of costly military gear. On the one hand I concur that nation-states indeed need armies, arms and ammunition in order to protect their territorial integrities. On the other hand, the subversive and illegal flow of arms and ammunitions (often into the hands of so-called rebel groups) must continue to raise eyebrows. When the exchange of gunshots and explosive ordnances remains the preferred mode of settling differences, then this modernized dog-eat-dog state-of-nature must be interrogated.

How did acceptable levels of militarism give way to irresponsibly fragmented militias? What made it easier to build up mutually antagonistic militias than to provide roads, hospitals and other infrastructures? Why was it easier to recruit child soldiers than to build schools and buy textbooks for children? How is it that supposedly poor African tribes are suddenly able to purchase seemingly inexhaustible quantities of arms, ammunition and other military hardware for the prosecution of nearly perpetual wars? Aptly Kasomo observed that "the contemporary multi-ethnic states have not yet succeeded in creating a pluralistic and homogeneous state that is able to overcome inter-group rivalry and conflicts."[83]

The advent of monotheistic religions (especially Islam and Christianity) can also be statistically linked to armed conflicts in many parts of Africa. Problems abound: if such violence became essential to the spreading and maintenance of monotheism, then perhaps the time is long overdue to call out all those that have converted monotheism into an idol that demands human sacrifices. Schwartz has noted that "monotheism is a myth that forges identity antithetically – against the other."[84] The potential for great violence against the *other* has never been more palpable: *my monotheistic god is better than your monotheistic god, thus I must coerce you to serve my monotheistic god.* The progressively intractable misdeeds of groups like *Boko Haram*, *Al-Shabab* and the Christian-Muslim conflicts in Central Africa and the Sudan are but few examples.

In addition to militarism animated by firearms, I must also mention a sinister form of *militarism* animated by biological micro-organisms. As if to darken an already dire state of affairs, some schools of thought have long been suspicious of the rise of so-called epidemics like AIDS[85] and Ebola in various African countries. Scientists like Moore have agonized over the curious origins of the AIDS virus. Moore outlined four mutually contradicting theories about the origins of the AIDS virus, concluding that "the solution almost certainly will come from one or more of four competing theories."[86] Add to this scientific confusion the immense amount of political and economic gimmicks that have been played around medications and vaccines for AIDS, and

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[83]Daniel Kasomo, "The Position of African Traditional Religion in Conflict Prevention," *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology* 2, no. 2 (February 2010): 23.

[84]Regina M. Schwartz, *The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 16.

[85] Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

[86]Jim Moore, "The Puzzling Origins of AIDS," *American Scientist* 92 (2004): 540.

what results is a humanitarian disaster waiting to happen. In the year 2013, a documentary titled "*Fire in the Blood*"[87] detailed the process by which "millions of Africans with AIDS […] have died because they couldn't afford the antiretroviral drugs that could have saved their lives."[88] Add to this quagmire the COVID-19 pandemic (that will ensure the long-lived infamy of the year 2020) and the painful politicization of scientific research work.

Responding to Multi-faceted Militarism

With respect to the proliferation of arms and militias, I contend that a certain lack of social cohesion continues to bedevil many African countries. The race-obsessed tendency to see everyone as "black" loses sight of linguistic, cultural and religious differences that morph into weak links in nation building. What is worse, these differences were hardly accounted for in the political philosophies that animate many African countries. I take the position that some of the political philosophies need to be re-imagined. The totalitarian political philosophies that depend upon violence for their legitimacy are in dire need of critique. This will take massive levels of education and re-orientation. In addition, alternative means of dispute resolution need to be looked into. African tribes are already richly blessed by the various flavours of ATR which teach adherents to seek to avoid "resolving […] conflicts through war and violence, […][but] learn from our traditional religion which advocated peace, justice and reconciliation at all cost."[89] To this end, I highlight the need to involve the local priests, priestesses, shamans (and so on) in the formation of the social contracts in African countries. Furthermore, it would be necessary to involve the myriad traditional societies, which "served to strengthen male prestige"[90] in dialogue toward the formation of a more just and peaceful social contract. Magesa devoted several pages to this issue,[91] citing examples from the eastern regions of Africa. In this manner, the social contract will be seen to contain symbols, linguistic or otherwise, which convey deeper meanings to the Africans themselves.

With regard to the deadly spread of micro-organisms, I propose a more intense study and application of medicinal plants. African countries are noted for the diverse array of plants thriving in well-preserved forests. The time has come to appreciate the medicinal treasure latent in these plants, rather than see the forests as obstacles to so-called 'development'. Thankfully, many people have already begun looking into the optimization of homeopathic[92] remedies of African Traditional Medicines.[93] This step will drive down the cost of healthcare due to the fact that homeopathy strives directly to strengthen the body against the onslaught of infectious microorganisms. Linked to the philosophy of education, homeopathic training will augment the

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[87]http://fireintheblood.com/

[88]Miriam Bale, "Where AIDS Steals Life by the Millions," *New York Times*, September 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/movies/fire-in-the-blood-spotlights-aids-in-africa.html?_r=1.

[89]Dickson Nkonge Kagema, "The Role of the African Traditional Religion in the Promotion of Justice, Reconciliation and Peace in Africa in the Twenty-First Century: A Kenyan Experience," *International Journal of African and Asian Studies* 15 (2015): 9.

[90]Geoffrey Parrinder, *West African Religion: A Study of the Beliefs and Practices of Akan, Ewe, Yoruba, Ibo, and Kindred Peoples.* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf& Stock Publishers, 2014), 128.

[91]LaurentiMagesa, *African Religion: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life* (New York: Orbis Books, 1997), 234–40.

[92] Homeopathy is the practice of medicine that embraces a holistic, natural approach to the treatment of the sick. Homeopathy is holistic because it treats the person as a whole, rather than focusing on a diseased part or alabelled sickness.

[93]Maurice M. Iwu, *Handbook of African Medicinal Plants*, 2nd ed (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2014).

dominant medical worldview linked with high costs of implementation. Tied to this is the avoidance of GMO,[94] given the suspicion and controversy that has plagued these food items for decades now.[95,96,97]

Conclusion: Toward an African Renaissance

I conclude by making a brief reflection on the African Renaissance:[98] a re-birth of the continent. Originated by Cheikh Anta Diop[99] in 1946, this idea was later to be popularized by Thabo Mbeki during his tenure as president of South Africa. I contend that engaging the debilitating triad (beginning by checkmating their deliterious effects) will put the continent on the path of the much-discussed renaissance. However, being strongly influenced by analytic philosophy (admitting that it is not the panacea for resolving all societal quagmires), I further contend that the African Renaissance must necessarily inherit and embrace the density that is at the heart of the reality called Africa. This means, for instance, that the renaissance of the whole of Africa must depend on the renaissance of the various portions and segments within the continent. I also maintain that this renaissance be seen "as an agenda for modernization, an agenda for neo-traditionalism, and an agenda for *Africanisation*"[100], proceeding by the rigorous interrogation of colonial grand narratives.

Finally, I contend that a clear distinction must be made and maintained between *civilization* and *Westernization* (or indeed any manifestation of cultural imperialism). Heidegger described the *dasein* as the "*shepherd of Being*."[101]It is up to African *daseins* to retain life-giving entities within their worldview, and to throw out life-denying idols. The time has come to jettison Afro-phobic thought processes and embrace Afrofuturism.

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[94] Genetically Modified Organism

[95]Ntomba Reginald, "The Zambian Example: Green and Unfarmed," *New African*, no. 537 (March 2014): 26–27.

[96]Monbiot George, "Beware of Greek Bearing Gifts," *New African*, no. 537 (March 2014): 20–21.

[97]Regina Jane Jere, "How Africa Can Feed Itself: Beyond Food Aid and Corporate Greed," *New African*, no. 537 (March 2014): 8–34.

[98]The African Renaissance must not imitate the Renaissance of Europe which took place between the 14th and 17th centuries of the Common Era.
[99]Cheikh Anta Diop, *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in African Culture & Development, 1946-1960*, trans. Egbuna P Modum (London: Karnak House, 1996).
[100]Ineke van Kessel, "In Search of an African Renaissance," *Quest* XV, no. 1–2 (2001): 43.
[101]Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," *Journal of Global Religious Vision* 1, no. 1 (2000): 91.

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Appendix-1: Resource Map of Africa

Book review

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Jonathan O. Chimakonam (Ed.) (2018). African Philosophy and Environmental Conservation. New York: Routledge, pp.i-xx; pp.1-234.

The book *African Philosophy and Environmental Conservation* comes at an appropriate time considering the current environmental crisis affecting the whole world as well as the lack of relevant literature articulating environmental and ethical issues from an African philosophical perspective. At the time of publication of this book, there was no single unified book addressing African environmental philosophy except for some essays contained in other titles on African ethics such as those by Ramose (1999), Imafidon and Bewaji (2014) and Murove (2009). This book is the first anthology on African environmental ethics consisting of 15 solid essays addressing fundamental issues on how environmental conservation could be meaningfully constructed in African philosophy.

The book draws from a variety of thinkers with different and diverse backgrounds and perspectives in African Philosophy. This diversity gives the book rich perspectives on which to critically draw on and construct an African philosophy of environmental conservation. It challenges African philosophers to critically reflect on how African philosophy might contribute to environmental conservation by confronting "big problems of our age, such as climate change, global warming, environmental degradation, women's issues" (p.xi) and social and environmental injustice.

The volume offers a comprehensive survey of the philosophical outlook of African environmental ethics. It broadly addresses in detail, some of the central themes in African environmental ethics such as: African eco-feminist environmental ethics (chps. 1, 2, 7, 8), the question of animal rights (chps. 3, 6), African ecocentric environmentalism (chps. 5), African relational ethics (chps. 4, 9, 11, 15), African theocentric environmental ethics (chps. 10, 12), anthropocentric environmental ethics (chp. 13) and *ubuntu* environmental ethics (chp.14). In dealing with these important topics, the book provides an excellent mix of different perspectives from sub-Saharan African philosophy on each of these central topics. Regrettably, the chapters are not arranged in accordance with the thematic areas that they fit into, making it difficult for the reader to quickly identify those chapters that hang together. In this review, I will follow the chronology of chapters, as presented in the book.

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The first chapter is a provocative quest for African ecofeminist environmental ethics. It involves two unique approaches to African philosophy, namely, peripherality and non-philosophy. It sets out to think about womanist philosophy and environmental philosophy in Africa (p.10, p12), as areas that lack attention in the current discourse on African philosophy. Seemingly, one would think that this chapter is actually confirming that womanist philosophy and African environmental philosophy are peripheral and non-philosophical. However, the chapter offers a fresh approach based on the need to expand the circle of African philosophy by moving from the obvious questions of African philosophy (p.20), and instead focus on what is conspicuously *peripheral* and at least deemed *non-philosophical* in order to make sense of womanist philosophy and environmental philosophy.

Chapter 2 feeds into the ecofeminist discussion and connects well with the first chapter as it draws an analogy of the Gaia hypothesis from the ancient Greek mythology and relates it to African mythology in order to construct an African ecofeminist approach to environmental ethics, one based on understanding the social injustice facing women in society first in order to also understand and confront anthropocentric thinking in society and ultimately environmental injustice. It seeks to revisit or at least reject some hard-line cultural beliefs and practices that are responsible for propping women and environmental oppression (p.29). Except for the transition from particular Igbo mythology to somewhat universal African mythology which is not so convincingly explained, this is a very interesting, ambitious and creative submission that the authors can consider developing further.

Chapter 3 proposes to construct the nature of human-non-human relations within the context of African culture, values and /or ethics. It specifically considers the question of whether African ethics is capable of grounding animal rights. It answers it in the affirmative by appealing to the African modal relational account of moral status (p.33), defending it against some earlier objections to it in some other discussions (see Horsthemke, 2015). It insists that humans have direct duties not to seriously harm animals for luxurious lifestyles (p.30) because animals are also within their hierarchy of existence, are vital forces in themselves, and that they have moral status as they have some communitarian relations with humans. Certainly, this chapter stimulates further controversies and conversations in the area of African animal rights ethics.

Chapter 4 attempts to construct the idea of human moral obligations towards non-human beings based on African relational environmental ethics. It carefully and critically appeals to the notion of interrelatedness within the African web of life to defend how it enriches human obligations to preserve biodiversity (p.43) for its own sake particularly species qua species and future generations. One of the strengths of this chapter is to successfully defend this position in spite of the challenge of anthropocentrism (p.44), some misconceptions about African ethics and even granting duties to species qua species and future generations. However, the major undoing of this chapter, in the end, is to defend a somewhat anthropocentric approach-ecotourism as a reason for preserving biodiversity.

Chapter 5 offers what I consider a significant contribution to the environmental politics of sustainable development in Africa. It challenges some inherently anthropocentric notions of development and urbanisation in south-west Nigeria. The chapter takes a holistic view that considers human and environmental development as interconnected contrary to pervasive

anthropocentric views separating these, as well as other factors threatening moral values (p.66). The only misgiving in this chapter is the sustained emphasis on the promotion of human happiness and human development throughout which might be read as espousing an anthropocentric argument. Nevertheless, the chapter proffers a promising argument for an appraisal of the ethics of development.

Chapter 6 is rooted in Yoruba cultural anthropology, and it tries to search and "discover the Yoruba normative conceptions of human-non-human animal relations, and to show that there are other perspectives in addition to the dominant animal liberation and animal rights positions" (p.72). The chapter brings in new dimensions to the interpretations of African culture and values which have traditionally been presented as not so much prioritising animal rights and care ethics. Except that it might be read differently as some sort of cultural anthropology because of its hermeneutical interpretation of animal ethics within the Yoruba culture, this is certainly a fine contribution fleshing out some ontological animal care ethics that are not only implicit within the Yoruba culture alone, but in most communities in sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter 7 also adds a voice to the ecofeminist dimension of African environmental ethics by focusing on the contribution of African indigenous knowledge to environmental conservation. It is a comprehensive submission showing how women have continued to contribute to human and environmental well-being and bio-diversity conservation in spite of the hardships that they face (p.86) owing to indigenous patriarchal gender roles and excesses (p.90). Yet political players and "policymakers do not include the views of women to climate mitigation measures" (p.92). In the end, this chapter boldly recommends the need for women to be included in social, political and economic decision-making processes that have a bearing on the environment.

Chapter 8 carefully and critically engages with the chauvinistic and patriarchal complexion of postcolonial African environmental philosophy. It does so by "raising some pertinent questions" (pp.104-9) from contributions by predominantly male African philosophers so far. The chapter then brings these questions into conversation with some of the most influential African women voices in environmental ethics as a way of bringing their environmental ethical philosophy to light. Perhaps this chapter could have been much more appealing had it also considered other women identities in African environmental ethics that are outside Nigeria.

Chapter 9 is a proposal for a new account of the ecosystem that could ground human moral obligations towards non-human beings. It is based on an articulation of a new relational account of the ecosystem from communitarian ethics binding *Ohanife* (network of living and non-living things) within the *Ezi n'ulo* (environment). It adopts some sophisticated conversational tools from Igbo metaphysics to advocate for an eco-bio-communitarian approach to the ecosystem showing how ontological equality between humans and non-human species in the ecosystem could be defended. Apart from the ambiguity of the use of non-humans throughout, the chapter makes an exciting argument for relational environmental ethics in African philosophy.

Chapter 10 makes an interesting critique of what can be considered as theocentric environmental ethics by bringing various religious perspectives to the symbolism and significance of trees. It systematically interrogates the anthropocentric and economic reasons largely attributed to the purported spiritual relationships that are thought to subsist between humans and trees in West African Christian and Muslim traditions. Adding a voice to the

theocentric view of environmental ethics, this chapter brings in some important religious dimensions to the hermeneutics of trees as the basis for interrogating environmental ethics in Africa.

Chapter 11 makes a compelling effort at trying to make African intellectual heritage and philosophy relevant to the challenges that humanity faces. In doing so, the chapter confronts the challenge of global warming from an African philosophical perspective. It brings the notions of African integration (interconnectedness), African science and African relational ethics into conversation with modern science and technology. The chapter makes a courageous accusation against modern science and technology for being largely responsible for the boomerang effects of global warming because of their exclusivist epistemology (p.153). In the end, it settles for an African philosophical framework as being capable of rescuing the world from the tide of global warming in our time (p.157) if the African intellectual heritage is carefully explored.

Chapter 12 takes stock of the current environmental crisis being witnessed the world over. It then proposes the Catholic theological teachings such as "concern for nature, justice for the poor, commitment to society, and interior peace" (p.165) as some of the cardinal social teachings to which humanity could plausibly appeal for environmental, ethical guidance. This is a fine theological reflection on how Catholic teachings could ground theocentric environmental ethics, although it is not quite clear how this submission fits within the discourse on African environmental conservation.

Chapter 13 remarkably confirms African worldviews and ethics as "fundamentally anthropocentric" (p.178). In the same spirit, it gives a courageous defence for moderate anthropocentrism as an alternative environmental, ethical model for Africa contrary to most non-anthropocentric arguments for African environmental ethics. Of interest, in the line of defence for this argument is the view that "it is the human being who problematises the questions of animal rights and the intrinsic value of physical nature . . . and that all our perspectives . . . are human epistemic windows" (p.183). This is a bold, realistic, fascinating, and honest although unpleasant position about the nature of African ethics in general as it is confirmatory that African ethics is entirely anthropocentric.

Chapter 14 is the only chapter in this book that specifically addresses *ubuntu environmental ethics* in greater detail. Although it also fits within the category of those that address relational environmental ethics, I think that this chapter is exceptional because of the way it invites the philosophy of ubuntu into conversation with the Zimbabwean environmental crisis. However, one would always think that this chapter could have broadly spoken to the African environmental crisis instead of limiting the environmental, ethical import of ubuntu to the Zimbabwean environmental crisis alone.

Chapter 15 ends the book by considering the environmental, ethical dimensions of totems and taboos in African meta-ethics. Although this chapter limits the import of taboo and totem wisdom to traditional Ghanaian communities, (which are not the only ones that rely on taboo and totem wisdom in Africa), it makes a protracted effort to argue why relational environmental ethics of totems and taboos ought to be infused into policy making processes in Africa. It persuasively argues for "the need to integrate modern laws, traditional customs and norms in the natural resources conservation and management for the benefit of generations yet unborn"

(p.210). In the end, it convincingly argues why the preservation of nature through taboos and totems might contribute to the preservation of African belief systems as well as the African economy through ecotourism.

Overall, the greatest merit of the book is that it has managed to articulate some of the pertinent environmental issues currently affecting humanity such as global warming, poverty, climate change, pollution and extinction of biodiversity. These issues are particularly examined using some essential African philosophical perspectives such as relational ethics, theocentric ethics, communitarian ethics, African ecofeminist ethics and ubuntu. However, some of the fundamental aspects of environmental ethics that are conspicuously absent from this book include questions on environmental politics with regards to the issues of environmental justice. I do not find any specific chapter that addresses the idea of environmental justice directly. Perhaps the editor might think about this in a revised edition of the book. Nevertheless, this book is very informative and of relevance to anyone willing to learn from and even contribute to conversations on African environmental philosophy.

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